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I. INTRODUCTION 
In general, an employment relationship between an employer 
and an employee is considered to be on an “at will” basis, meaning 
that either the employee or the employer can terminate the relation-
ship at any time for any reason, without liability.
1
  An employment re-
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 1 See RICHARD A. BALES, JEFFREY M. HIRSCH & PAUL M. SECUNDA, UNDERSTANDING 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 1 (2007) (noting that employment “at will” means that an employ-
er or employee can terminate the employment relationship for any reason); SAMUEL 
ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 39 (3d 
ed. 2008) (“American common law generally construes employment for an indefinite 
or unstated term as a relationship which may be terminated ‘at will’ by either par-
ty.”); Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment as an Interjurisdic-
tional Race to the Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV. 453, 459 (2008) 
(“Today, the at-will rule remains the default employment rule in every state but Mon-
tana . . . .”); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 118, 118 (1976) (“In almost every jurisdiction in the United States an 
employer can discharge an employee without notice and without cause unless the 
duration of the employment relation is specified in an employment contract.”).  The 
classic statement of the employment-at-will doctrine is that an employer has the right 
to “dismiss their employees at will . . . for good cause, for no cause or even for cause 
morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.”  Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. 
Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 
S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915); see Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and 
Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 683 (1994) 
(referring to the Payne statement as the “now classic statement of the rule”).  Mon-
tana is the exception.  See Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (Westlaw through 2009); see also MODEL EMPLOYMENT 
TERMINATION ACT (1991).  Interestingly, the Montana statute was enacted after em-
ployers complained of large damage awards for wrongful terminations based on vi-
olations of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  See Jonathan Tomp-
kins, Legislating the Employment Relationship: Montana’s Wrongful-Discharge Law, 14 EMP. 
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lationship will be construed as other than “at will,” however, if a con-
tract or statute so provides.
2
 
Typical examples of written contracts providing for job security 
include collective bargaining agreements between unions and em-
ployers, which almost always include a provision prohibiting the em-
ployer from terminating employees for other than “just cause” or 
“good cause,”
3




REL. L.J. 387, 387 (1998).  Although the statute prohibits terminations without just 
cause, it limits damages to lost wages.  Id. at 394. 
 2 See BALES, HIRSCH & SECUNDA, supra note 1, at 1 (same); ESTREICHER & HARPER, 
supra note 1, at 39 (noting that a contract or statute can create an exception to the 
“at will” rule).  Noteworthy examples of statutory exceptions to the “at will” rule in-
clude the anti-discrimination statutes, which prohibit covered employers from termi-
nating employees because of their race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or 
disability.  Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 
(2006) (age); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 
(2006) (race, color, religion, sex, and national origin); Americans With Disabilities 
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006) (disability); see also National Labor Re-
lations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006) (prohibiting covered employers 
from terminating employees for engaging in concerted activities to improve working 
conditions).  Also, government employees “are protected by tenure arrangements or 
other civil service procedural devices.”  Theodore J. St. Antoine, You’re Fired!, HUM. 
RTS. Q., Winter 1982, at 32, 34. 
 3 See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Industrial Freedom: On Limiting the 
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1410 (1967) (noting that 
“just cause” provisions are “typically found in collective agreements”); Mary Ann 
Glendon & Edward R. Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An 
Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C. L. REV. 457, 462 (1979) (“[P]ractically all collective 
bargaining agreements provide in substance that no employee in the bargaining unit 
may be discharged, suspended, or otherwise disciplined except for ‘just,’ ‘good,’ or 
‘proper’ cause . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Gary Minda, The Common Law of Employment 
At-Will in New York: The Paralysis of Nineteenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 
946 (1985) (“[P]rivate sector employees enjoy job security through collective bar-
gaining provisions permitting employer discipline or discharge only for ‘just cause.’  
Nearly every collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a union today contains a 
provision that protects members of the bargaining unit against unjust discipline and 
discharge.”); Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. 
REV. 999, 1007 (1955) (noting that collective bargaining agreements generally pro-
vide that discipline and discharge “shall be for cause, or good cause”); Clyde W. 
Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. 
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 78 (2000) (noting “[t]he near universal acceptance of just cause 
protection in collective agreements”); St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 34 (noting eighty 
percent of collective bargaining agreements “expressly prohibit discharge or discip-
line except for ‘cause’ or ‘just cause.’” (footnote omitted)). 
 4 See St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 34 (noting that one of the three different 
groups of employees who have avoided the at-will rule include “the handful of per-
sons whose knowledge or talents are so unusual and valuable that they have the leve-
rage to negotiate a contract for a fixed term with their employer”); Summers, supra 
note 3, at 68 (observing that only upper-level managers have employment contracts 
with a provision providing for job security). 
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In the absence of a union or the employee being a key employee, it is 
unusual, however, for an employee and an employer to have a written 
contract promising job security.  Some courts have held that em-
ployee manuals and handbooks distributed by an employer can con-
stitute a contract providing for job security,
5
 but courts are often re-
luctant to make such a finding,
6
 and in any event, a manual’s or 
handbook’s contractual nature can usually be avoided by an explicit 
disclaimer indicating that it is not a contract.
7
 
An oral promise of job security can, however, rise to the level of 
an enforceable promise.
8
  For example, an employer might orally 
promise the employee that he or she will remain employed for a de-
finite period of time, or for as long as he or she performs satisfactori-
ly, or that he or she will only be terminated for good cause.
9
 
Even if such a promise is otherwise enforceable,
10
 however, the 
oral nature of the promise renders it subject to a Statute of Frauds 
(“the Statute”) defense.
11
  Specifically, such a promise might be con-
sidered incapable of being performed within a year, thus necessitat-
 
 5 See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 
(Mich. 1980) (allowing a handbook to be considered part of the employment con-
tract); Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Em-
ployees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082, 1101 
(1984) (noting that Toussaint “was considered a breakthrough decision”). 
 6 See, e.g., Walton v. Health Care Dist. of Palm Beach County, 862 So. 2d 852, 855 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“Florida’s courts have expressed a decided reluctance to 
find that provisions in an employee handbook or policies and procedures manual 
rise to the level of enforceable rights . . . .”). 
 7 See Summers, supra note 3, at 75 (“[T]his protection has been seriously under-
cut by allowing employers to escape contractual liability by including in the hand-
book a disclaimer provision . . . .”).  See generally Stephen F. Befort, Employee Hand-
books and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 326 (1991) (examining the 
use of disclaimers in employee handbooks). 
 8 See Lucy Haroutunian, Comment, Employee, You Have a Job For Life: But Is This 
Oral Promise Enforceable Under the Statute of Frauds?, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 493, 496 (1998) 
(“Often, due to the lack of a written contract, an employee’s only evidence of a con-
tract is an oral assurance or oral promise by an employer or an employer’s agent that 
the employee has job security.”). 
 9 See BALES, HIRSCH & SECUNDA, supra note 1, at 43 (“The first way at-will em-
ployment typically is changed is by a contract between the employer and an individu-
al employee.  Such a contract may be written or oral, express or implied, definite-
term or satisfaction.”); Haroutunian, supra note 8, at 496 (“An example is a promise 
that an employee has a job for life or for as long as he performs satisfactorily.”). 
 10 See, e.g., Montgomery County Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 
1998) (holding that employer’s oral assurance to employee that she would remain 
employed as long as she did a good job was too indefinite to constitute an offer). 
 11 See BALES, HIRSCH & SECUNDA, supra note 1, at 47–49 (discussing applicability of 
the Statute to oral promises of job security). 
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ing the promise to be evidenced by a writing to be enforceable.
12
  On 
the other hand, courts might construe the employer’s promise as 
providing the employer or the employee with the right to terminate 
the employment relationship within one year.  In such cases, the con-
tract might be considered capable of being performed within one 
year of its formation and thus outside of the Statute. 
Courts that have addressed these issues have reached conflicting 
results.
13
  Essentially, the issue revolves around whether any retained 
right by either the employee or the employer to terminate the em-
ployment relationship within one year of its formation means that the 
contract can be performed within a year or alternatively, whether 
such a right to terminate is considered either the defeasance of the 
contract based on excusable nonperformance or cancellation based 
on the other party’s breach.
14
  If it means the contract can be per-
formed within one year, the Statute is not a bar; if the right to termi-
nate the relationship is construed as either defeasance based on ex-
cusable nonperformance or cancellation based on breach, the Statute 
renders the contract unenforceable.
15
 
This Article maintains that in “close” or “doubtful” cases, an 
event that permits early termination of an employment contract 
should be construed as excusable nonperformance instead of per-
formance.  Such an approach is consistent with the purpose of the 
Statute’s one-year provision and the purpose of the employment-at-
 
 12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110(1)(e) (1981) (“The following 
classes of contracts are subject to a statute, commonly called the Statute of Frauds, 
forbidding enforcement unless there is a written memorandum or an applicable ex-
ception: . . . a contract that is not to be performed within one year from the making 
therefore (the one-year provision).”). 
 13 See BALES, HIRSCH & SECUNDA, supra note 1, at 48 (“The statute of frauds is dif-
ficult to apply to employment cases, and courts (often within the same jurisdiction) 
are inconsistent.”). 
 14 See id. (“Part of the problem derives from a longstanding disagreement over 
the meaning of performance, termination, and excusable nonperformance.”). 
If a court determines the parties intended the occurrence of the con-
tingency to constitute full performance of the contract within one year 
from the date of its making, that contract is enforceable under the sta-
tute of frauds. On the other hand, if the parties intended the occur-
rence of the contingency to terminate the contract, or failed to address 
the contingency, that contract is not enforceable under the statute of 
frauds. 
Haroutunian, supra note 8, at 499. 
 15 As stated by three leading employment law commentators, the issue “derives 
from a longstanding disagreement over the meaning of performance, termination, 
and excusable nonperformance.”  BALES, HIRSCH & SECUNDA, supra note 1, at 48. 
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  Part II of this Article provides a brief background on 
the Statute of Frauds, including the history of its enactment, its pur-
pose, and its treatment by the courts, with an emphasis on the Sta-
tute’s one-year provision.  Part III discusses the employment-at-will 
doctrine, with an emphasis on the likely reasons for its adoption.  
Part IV reviews the leading decisions involving oral promises of job 
security and the Statute.  Part V sets forth the appropriate rules for 
determining whether an oral promise of job security is unenforceable 
under the Statute’s one-year provision.
17
 
II. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
The history of the Statute begins with the state of English con-
tract law before the seventeenth century.  Originally, under English 
common law, there was no general basis for enforcing promises.
18
  Ra-
ther, enforcement of a promise had to occur through one of the es-
tablished forms of action.
19
 
Several of the established forms of action could be used to en-
force particular types of promises, but each had its limitations.  The 
writ of covenant, which arose near the end of the twelfth century
20
 
and which originally could be used at times to enforce informal 
promises, was by 1321 restricted to promises made under seal.
21
 
The writ of detinue provided for the recovery of goods from one 
who had obtained possession of them lawfully but who no longer had 
the right to possess them.
22
  Detinue would presumably be available to 
enforce a promise to deliver goods, provided title to them had passed 
 
 16 Professor Frank Vickory has argued that the Statute should be amended to 
avoid the enforcement of oral promises of permanent employment.  See Frank Vick-
ory, The Erosion of the Employment-at-Will Doctrine and the Statute of Frauds: Time to Amend 
the Statute, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 97, 119–20 (1992).  The merits of such a proposal are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 17 How the Statute should apply to oral promises of job security that are enforce-
able under the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an issue beyond the scope of this 
Article.  Rather, this Article’s scope is limited to promises that are enforceable as part 
of a bargained-for exchange. 
 18 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 11–12 (4th ed. 2004). 
 19 Id. at 12. 
 20 Id. at 13. 
 21 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 318–19 (4th ed. 
2002). 
 22 JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 110 (9th ed. 2008). 
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The writ of debt enabled the recovery of a sum certain in money, 
but only if the promisee had performed his side of the bargain and 
thus given a benefit to the promisor.
25
  Also, a defendant in an action 
of debt could avoid liability through so-called “wager of law,” which 
permitted the defendant to avoid liability by having a number of 




The writ of assumpsit could be used to recover loss to person or 
property as a result of the promisor’s misfeasance in the performance 
of a promised undertaking
27
 and thereafter was extended to econom-
ic losses caused by reliance on an unperformed promise.
28
  Near the 
end of the sixteenth century, common-law courts extended assumpsit 
even further, permitting its use to enforce unperformed promises 
where there had been no reliance by the promisee.
29
  Thus, assumpsit 
offered a form of action that could possibly provide a general theory 
for enforcing promises.  Also, an advantage of assumpsit was the 
availability of a jury trial that, unlike debt, could not be defeated by 
the defendant’s wager of law.
30
  Importantly, though, where an action 
of debt was available, the plaintiff could not use assumpsit, and this 
proved disadvantageous to creditors.
31
 
By the middle of the sixteenth century, however, assumpsit be-
gan making inroads on the use of debt.  For example, by this time, an 
action in assumpsit could be brought if a defendant who was already 
indebted to the plaintiff made a subsequent promise to pay a particu-
lar sum.
32
 This form of action became known as indebitatus assump-
sit, or “general assumpsit,” as distinguished from the older form of 
assumpsit, which was known as “special assumpsit.”
33
  The death knell 
for debt, and the triumph of assumpsit, finally came in 1602 as a re-
 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 13–14. 
 26 Id. at 14. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 15. 
 29 Id. at 15–16. 
 30 Id. at 17. 
 31 FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 17. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
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sult of Slade’s Case.
34
  In that case, the court held that a debt alone, 
without a subsequent express promise to pay the amount owed, could 
support an action in general assumpsit.
35
  As a result, a creditor was 
assured a jury trial,
36
 and the decision virtually put an end to the use 
of wager of law.
37
  Because a judgment in assumpsit barred an action 
of debt for the same amount and vice versa, “the action of debt on a 
contract went almost out of use.”
38
  Slade’s Case thus had the beneficial 
effect of unifying contract law through the action of assumpsit.
39
 
But there were downsides to unifying contract law through as-
sumpsit.  Whereas wager of law had protected defendants from frau-
dulent claims of debt, after Slade’s Case the only protection for defen-
dants from such claims was the jury, and the jury, for a variety of 
reasons, was not well-suited for this new task.
40
  For example, during 
this period of English law, the jury was not entitled to the benefit of 
the testimony of the parties or any interested person;
41
 juries, while 
not familiar with the parties and the dispute, were also not the disin-
terested jurors of current times;
42
 and there was an undeveloped law 
of evidence.
43
  As a result, there was “a distrust of the ability of juries 
to determine the truth of conflicting testimony about the making of a 
 
 34 Slade’s Case, (1602) 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B.).  For useful discussions of Slade’s 
Case, see J. H. Baker, New Light on Slade’s Case, 29 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 51 (1971); David 
Ibbetson, Sixteenth Century Contract Law: Slade’s Case in Context, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 295 (1984); H. K. Lücke, Slade’s Case and the Origin of the Common Counts, 81 L. 
Q. REV. 422 (1965); A. W. B. Simpson, The Place of Slade’s Case in the History of Con-
tract, 74 L. Q. REV. 381 (1958). 
 35 FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 17. 
 36 Id. at 18. 
 37 BAKER, supra note 21, at 345; see also id. at 348 (“A direct consequence of Slade’s 
Case was the complete replacement of wager of law by jury trial in disputed actions to 
recover debts.”). 
 38 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 286 (2d ed. 1979). 
 39 Id. at 287. 
 40 BAKER, supra note 21, at 348–49. 
 41 See BAKER, supra note 38, at 288–89 (“The parties themselves, and interested 
persons, were excluded from the witness box at common law on the assumption that 
their testimony would be biased and therefore worthless.”); Hugh Evander Willis, The 
Statute of Frauds—A Legal Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427, 430 (1928) (explaining that 
when the Statute was enacted, “neither the parties to the action, nor their husbands 
or wives, nor any person who had any interest in the result of the litigation, were 
competent witnesses”). 
 42 James J. O’Connell, Jr., Comment, Boats Against the Current: The Courts and the 
Statute of Frauds, 47 EMORY L.J. 253, 257 (1998). 
 43 Id. 
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  There was also a lack of judicial control over juries,
45
 
which included an inability to reverse verdicts contrary to the manif-
est weight of the evidence,
46
 and contract law was not well developed 
at the time such that it could provide suitable guidance to the jury.
47
 
Defendants were perceived to be at a disadvantage and at risk of 
having contractual liability when no contract was made.
48
  If wager of 
law had resulted in perjury in favor of defendants, the use of assump-
sit resulted in perjury in favor of plaintiffs.
49
  During the “Restoration 
period[,] the problem was keenly felt.”
50
  One jurist remarked in 1671 
that two men could no longer talk together without one of them 
claiming a promise had been made.
51
 
But it was too late to judicially change Slade’s Case, and thus a leg-
islative answer was sought.
52
  A return to wager of law was not seriously 
pursued, but a writing requirement for certain types of promises ap-
peared to be a convenient solution, which would be a partial return 




 44 DAWSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 907. 
 45 See Willis, supra note 41, at 429 (“[T]he modern control of the court over the 
jury, in the matter of the limits and elements of injury, the rules by which compensa-
tion for pecuniary injuries shall be ascertained, and in cases of passion and preju-
dice, was only just beginning.” (footnote omitted)). 
 46 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 63 (5th ed. 
2000). 
 47 See Willis, supra note 41, at 431. 
[A]t the time of the enactment [of the Statute,] the modern informal 
contract law was in the making. The law of agreement, consideration, 
conditions, illegality, etc., had not been fully worked out.  The Statute 
of Frauds was an attempt to cover a field now perhaps adequately cov-
ered by other topics.  If our modern contract law had existed in the se-
venteenth century, there probably would have been no fourth and se-
venteenth sections of the Statute of Frauds at least. 
Id. 
 48 O’Connell, supra note 42, at 255–56. 
 49 BAKER, supra note 21, at 349. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id.  It has been asserted that “the confusion attending the rapid succession of 
Civil War, Cromwellian dictatorship, and Restoration . . . encouraged unscrupulous 
litigants to pursue false or groundless claims with the help of manufactured evi-
dence.”  E. Rabel, The Statute of Frauds and Comparative Legal History, 63 L. Q. REV. 
174, 174 (1947) (quoting G.C. CHESIRE & C.H. FIFOOT, LAW OF CONTRACT 106 (1946) 
and citing LORD WRIGHT, LEGAL ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 225 (1939)). 
 52 BAKER, supra note 21, at 349. 
 53 Id. 
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The legislative solution chosen was the Statute, which was 
enacted in 1677
54
 and entitled “An Act for the Prevention of Frauds 
and Perjuries.”
55
  The Statute had two related goals: (1) protecting 
defendants from perjury and (2) curbing the power of juries.
56
  The 
only explicit statement of the Statute’s purpose was included in an in-
troductory clause that provided as follows: “For prevention of many 
fraudulent Practices which are commonly endeavored to be upheld 
by Perjury and Subornation of Perjury Be[] it enacted . . . .”
57
 
Section 4 of the Statute identified the following five classes of 
contracts that needed to be in writing to be enforceable: (1) “to 
charge any Executor or Administrator upon any special[] promise to 
answer[] damages out of his own[] Estate”; (2) “to charge the Defen-
dant upon any special[] promise to answer[] for the debt default or 
miscarriages of another person”; (3) “to charge any person upon any 
agreement made upon consideration of Marriage”; (4) “any Contract 
or Sale of Lands Tenements or Hereditaments or any Interest in or 
concerning them”; and (5) “any Agreement that is not to be per-
 
 54 The date of the Statute has been the subject of dispute, but 1677 is the date 
that is now generally accepted.  See George P. Costigan, Jr., The Date and Authorship of 
the Statute of Frauds, 26 HARV. L. REV. 329, 341 (1913) (“[T]he Statute of Frauds was 
finally passed and received the royal assent on April 16, 1677 . . . .”); Crawford D. 
Hening, The Original Drafts of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II c. 3) and Their Authors, 61 
U. PA. L. REV. 283, 285 (1913) (“[T]he final draft of the bill, as passed by both houses 
and assented to by the Crown, was not made until April 16, 1677 . . . .”); Willis, supra 
note 41, at 427 (“There has been a difference of opinion among law writers as to the 
date . . . of the Statute of Frauds; but it now seems to be settled that the correct date 
for this celebrated Statute is April 16, 1677 . . . . ” (footnote omitted)). 
 55 An Act for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (Eng.); 
see D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 992, 993 (N.Y. 1984) 
(“The ancient Statute of Frauds is derived from the original English ‘Act for Preven-
tion of Frauds and Perjuries’ enacted in 1677 . . . .”). 
 56 Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel’s Next Conquest?, 
36 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1422–23 (1983); see also D & N Boening, Inc., 472 N.E.2d at 993 
(“The entire Statute was intended to prevent fraud in the proving of certain legal 
transactions particularly susceptible to deception, mistake and perjury . . . .”); Costi-
gan, supra note 54, at 343–44 (noting that Professor James Bradley Thayer had sur-
mised that the Statute was intended primarily to keep certain kinds of cases from ju-
ries, and stating that “[t]he judges who framed the Statute of Frauds were . . . 
anxious to tie the hands of juries . . . .”); Willis, supra note 41, at 427 (“The original 
purpose for the enactment of the statute of Frauds was to prevent fraud caused by 
perjury; or in other words, to make it sure that legal effect should not be given to 
transactions never entered into, and that parties should not be held on promises 
never made.”). 
 57 An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (Eng.). 
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formed within the space of one year[] from the mak[ing] thereof.”
58
  
Section 17 of the Statute required that certain contracts for the sale 
of goods be in writing.
59
  It has been suggested that these classes of 
contracts were chosen because these were “the groups of cases in 
which the courts had encountered trouble because of uncertainty of 




It is not known for sure, however, why contracts that were not to 
be performed within one year were included in the Statute,
61
 and the 
provision’s purpose has baffled courts, lawyers, and historians.
62
  The 
traditional explanation, and the one given by a jurist in 1697, was the 
desire to not “trust to the memory of witnesses for a longer time than 
one year.”
63
  The theory is that fraudulent claims could succeed in 
these types of cases because the “memory of an agreement’s exact 
terms and of the rights and responsibilities of its parties, availability of 
witnesses, etc., all suffer when actions on oral contracts are stretched 
out over several years.”
64
  “[B]ecause these were continuing con-
tracts—it might be very difficult to find any evidence at the time they 
 
 58 Id. § 4; see Jeffrey G. Steinberg, Promissory Estoppel as a Means of Defeating the Sta-
tute of Frauds, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 114, 114 (noting that “[o]f the original twenty-five 
sections [of the Statute], only the fourth and seventeenth are important for contract 
purposes”). 
 59 An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 17 
(Eng.). 
 60 Rabel, supra note 51, at 184. 
 61 Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunc-
tions of Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 77 (1974). 
 62 See Prof’l Bull Riders, Inc. v. AutoZone, Inc., 113 P.3d 757, 759 (Colo. 2005); 
P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 208 (1979); see also C.R. 
Klewin, Inc. v. Flagship Props., Inc., 600 A.2d 772, 775 (Conn. 1991) (noting that of 
the Statute’s various provisions, the one-year provision “has caused the greatest puz-
zlement among commentators”). 
 63 Smith v. Westall, (1697) 91 Eng. Rep. 1106, 1107 (K.B.); see also Boydell v. 
Drummond, (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 958, 965 (1809) (K.B.) (Justice Bayley stating that 
the purpose of the provision was to prevent “the leaving to memory the terms of a 
contract for longer time than a year”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 
cmt. a (1981) (“The design was said to be not to trust to the memory of witnesses for 
a longer time than one year . . . .”); 4 CAROLINE N. BROWN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 
§ 19.1, at 571 (Rev. ed. 1997) [hereinafter CORBIN] (“Where actions on contracts are 
long delayed, injustice is likely to be done because of bad memory or because wit-
nesses have died or moved away . . . [a]nd in the case of a contract whose perfor-
mance is to cover a long period of time, actions are likely to be long delayed.”).” 
 64 O’Connell, supra note 42, at 286; see also Vickory, supra note 16, at 98–99 (“This 
rule recognizes that since witnesses become unavailable and memories fade over 
time, the possibility of enforcing fabricated verbal agreements increases with time.”). 
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came to be enforced.”
65
  Under this theory, the one-year provision’s 
purpose was consistent with the Statute’s overall purpose and was not 
concerned with whether it was worthwhile to use the power of the 
state to enforce a particular type of promise.  Rather, it was con-
cerned with whether a promise had been made at all. 
But courts and commentators have noted that the one-year pro-
vision does not always effectuate the purpose of dealing with this 
problem because there is no necessary relationship between the 
length of time it takes to perform a contract, when the contract is 
breached, and when a lawsuit is brought.
66
  For example, a long-term 
contract might be breached soon after it is made and a lawsuit 
brought soon thereafter.  In such a situation, the time between the 
making of the contract and the lawsuit would be short.  In contrast, a 
plaintiff might not bring suit on a short-term contract until just be-
fore the statute of limitations expires, and the time between the mak-
ing of the contract and the lawsuit might therefore be long. 
It is difficult to believe, however, that the Statute’s drafters did 
not have in mind specific purposes for including the one-year provi-
sion, and it is likewise difficult to believe they would have drafted a 
provision that did not effectively implement those purposes.  As sev-
eral commentators have noted, “The legislation certainly was not 
concocted hastily.  It was formally pending for more than four years 
before its passage, went through numerous revisions, many of which 
were substantial, and accumulated new clauses suggested by a variety 
of legal experts of the time.”
67
 
P.S. Atiyah has suggested that 
it seems . . . at least possible that [the one-year] provision was 
simply designed to put an outer limit to the enforcing of executo-
ry contracts.  A man might bind himself for the future if he 
 
 65 Willis, supra note 41, at 431. 
 66 See D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 992, 993 (N.Y. 
1984); see also C.R. Klewin, Inc. v. Flagship Props., Inc., 600 A.2d 772, 776 (Conn. 
1991) (“That explanation is, however, unpersuasive, since . . . the language of the 
statute is ill suited to this purpose.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 
cmt. a (1981) (“The design was said to be not to trust to the memory of witnesses for 
a longer time than one year, but the statutory language was not appropriate to carry 
out that purpose. The result has been a tendency to construction narrowing the ap-
plication of the statute.”); 4 CORBIN, supra note 63, § 19.1, at 578 (stating that “this 
provision of the statute is . . . ill-supported by any sensible rationale”). 
 67 DAWSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 907. 
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pleased, but, at least in the absence of writing, he was not to be 
held bound to any performance due more than a year later.
68
 
But this theory—seemingly premised on a notion of government pa-
ternalism—suffers from the fact it would not fulfill the Statute’s pur-
pose, which was aimed at fraudulent claims.  Rather than being di-
rected at whether a promise was made, it would be directed at 
whether enforcing a particular promise was worthwhile. 
Professor Joseph M. Perillo has proposed the following theory: 
“It seems quite likely . . . that as in the case of other subdivisions the 
draftsmen had in mind a transaction type: employment and similar 
relationships, such as apprenticeships and fiduciary retainers.”
69
  Pro-
fessor A.W.B. Simpson has also suggested that contracts of service 
might have been the purpose of the one-year provision.
70
  As he 
notes, it is possible that the one-year provision was borrowed from 
Scotland, which in the seventeenth century required proof by writ for 
contracts of service for more than one year.
71
 
As discussed below, English common law presumed employment 
to be for a term of one year.  It makes sense that if a person sought to 
establish a period of employment for more than the one-year pre-
sumption, he should be required to do so with a writing evidencing 
the promise.  If it is unusual for a particular promise to have been 
made, more evidence than usual should be demanded to prove the 
alleged promise.
72
  This theory would be consistent with the Statute’s 
overall purpose and would be directed at determining whether a 
promise had been made, rather than being directed at whether it is 
worthwhile to enforce the particular type of promise.  (Of course, this 
theory could also be premised on the belief that it is not worthwhile 
to enforce long-term employment and service contracts.)  But as 
noted by Professor Farnsworth, such a purpose is inconsistent with 
 
 68 ATIYAH, supra note 62, at 208. 
 69 Perillo, supra note 61, at 77 n.214. 
 70 See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF 
THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 611–12 (paperback ed. 1987). 
 71 See id. at 612. 
 72 Courts in the United States often used this rationale to require “additional 
consideration” (i.e., consideration other than the employee providing services to the 
employer) to prove an employer’s alleged promise of job security.  See Darlington v. 
Gen. Elec., 504 A.2d 306, 314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (discussing “additional consider-
ation” requirement and its use as an interpretation device), overruled on other grounds, 
Krajsa v. Keypunch, Inc., 622 A.2d 355, 360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
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the one-year period running from the date of the contract’s forma-
tion as opposed to the date performance is to begin.
73
 
Thus, we are left without a satisfactory explanation of the origi-
nal purpose of the one-year provision, assuming we demand an ex-
planation that is a perfect fit.  At this point, one could simply aban-
don an attempt to explain the one-year provision’s purpose.  Or, 
accepting that no explanation will be a perfect fit, one could piece 
together the most plausible explanation, taking into consideration 
the various rationales that have been advanced for the Statute and 
the one-year provision as well as other plausible explanations. 
If the latter approach is adopted, the best interpretation of the 
one-year provision’s purpose is that it was aimed primarily at em-
ployment and service contracts, and it was aimed at such contracts for 
a variety of reasons, including that (1) it was unusual to have such an 
arrangement in excess of one year; (2) it was often difficult to deter-
mine the truth in such cases since they were often brought long after 
the alleged oral promise was made (i.e., when the employee or em-
ployer terminated the relationship after the typical one-year period 
had elapsed); (3) the risk of error in such cases would be of particu-
lar concern because the remedy for a breach of a long-term contract 
was likely to be substantial; and (4) it simply was not good policy to 
hold a person to such a long-term contract, particularly when the 
person had not reduced it to writing and thus perhaps not given it 
the desired contemplation. These rationales give primacy to the Sta-
tute’s purpose of avoiding fraudulent claims (the first, second, and 
third bases), but also include as a basis the belief that it is not worth-
while to enforce long-term oral employment contracts (the fourth ba-
sis). 
I do not suggest that each member of Parliament who voted for 
the Statute had in mind each of these rationales.  Rather, I suggest 
that most of the members likely had in mind employment or service 
contracts and that most of the members had such contracts in mind 
for one or more of the four reasons I have provided.  Although the 
one-year provision does not perfectly implement each of the ratio-
nales provided, it does a good job of providing a general rule to ad-
dress the myriad of concerns raised.  Although the one-year provision 
might be both underinclusive and overinclusive with respect to the 
concerns raised, so is any general rule. 
 
 73 FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 372–73. 
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Each state in the United States has enacted its own version of the 
Statute, with the exception of Louisiana, Maryland, and New Mexico, 
and the latter two have held by judicial decision that the original Sta-
tute was received into the state.
74
  Although most of the Statute was 
repealed in England in 1954,
75
 and despite the fact it has been criti-
cized in the United States as an anachronism that promotes more 
fraud than it prevents,
76
 the Statute remains part of our law.
77
  In fact, 





 74 Id. at 354 & n.5; O’Connell, supra note 42, at 258 (noting that the Statute “has 
been adopted, either by legislation or via judicial opinion, more or less intact by for-
ty-nine states.  Louisiana is the only exception.”).  The current version of Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code requires that contracts for the sale of goods for the 
price of $500 or more be evidenced by a writing.  U.C.C. § 2-201.  The current ver-
sion of Article 2 has been adopted in every state except Louisiana.  WHITE & 
SUMMERS, supra note 46, at 4. 
 75 See O’Connell, supra note 42, at 259–60 (“[I]n 1954, Parliament repealed all of 
the Statute except for the provision dealing with agreements to answer for the debt 
of another and contracts for the sale of land. . . . [T]he English based this repeal, in 
large part, on the theory that the Statute caused more fraud than it prevented.” 
(footnote omitted)); see also Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954, 2 & 
3 Eliz. 2, c. 34 (Eng.). 
 76 Willis, supra note 41, at 432; Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 
101, 106 (2d Cir. 1985). 
     Whatever may be the fact with regard to the history of the statute, 
and whatever may have been the difficulties arising from proof that all 
sides agree brought about the enactment of the statute of frauds over 
300 years ago, it is an anachronism today.  The reasons that prompted 
its passage no longer exist.  And, far from serving as a barrier to 
fraud—in the case of a genuinely aggrieved plaintiff barred from en-
forcing an oral contract—the statute may actually shield fraud. 
Id. at 106; see also Francis M. Burdick, A Statute for Promoting Fraud, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 
273, 274 (1916) (noting that the Statute promotes more fraud than it prevents); Ra-
bel, supra note 51, at 187 (“[T]he Statute essentially belongs to distant times, far re-
moved from the conditions of modern life.”). 
 77 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 355 (“Statutes of frauds remain in this coun-
try despite their many critics.”); O’Connell, supra note 42, at 256 (“Not even the de-
mise of the Statute in the nation of its birth has been enough to bring about its eli-
mination in the United States because by the time its English parents saw fit to put it 
down, the Statute had already placed one foot firmly in the mud on this side of the 
Atlantic[,]” and has remained here by “hop[ping] regularly, if not always gracefully, 
from state code to state code, from judicial opinion to judicial opinion.”) (quoting 
James Fitzjames Stephen & Frederick Pollock, Section 17 of the Statute of Frauds, 1 L. Q. 
Rev. 1, 6 (1885)); see also Steinberg, supra note 58, at 115 (“[T]he legislatures of vir-
tually every state have maintained their individual statutes paralleling the English 
original.”). 
 78 O’Connell, supra note 42, at 267; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW 205 (3d ed. 2005) (“The states adopted the statute almost verbatim.”).  
The proposed revisions to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code would only 
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Despite the Statute’s vitality in the United States, courts have in-
terpreted the Statute narrowly,
79
 and this is particularly true with re-
spect to the one-year provision.
80
  One reason for this narrow inter-
pretation of the one-year provision is because, as previously 




Accordingly, following English precedent established well before 
1776,
82
 courts have generally limited the provision to contracts that 
cannot possibly be performed within one year,
83
 even if performance 
within one year is unlikely.
84
  Thus, for example, “[c]ontracts of un-
certain duration are simply excluded . . . .”
85
  This rule does not, how-
 
require a writing for contracts for the sale of goods for the price of $5,000 or more.  
U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (Proposed Amendments 2003). 
 79 FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 357. 
 80 Id. at 357 n.22 (citation omitted); 4 CORBIN, supra note 63, § 19.1, at 572 (“In 
its actual application, the courts have perhaps been even less friendly to this provi-
sion than to the other provisions of the statute.”). 
 81 See supra note 66. 
 82 See Warner v. Tex. & Pac. Ry., 164 U.S. 418, 422–23 (1896). 
     It thus appears to have been the settled construction of this clause 
of the statute in England, before the Declaration of Independence, 
that an oral agreement which, according to the intention of the parties, 
as shown by the terms of the contract, might be fully performed within 
a year from the time it was made, was not within the statute, although 
the time of its performance was uncertain, and might probably extend, 
and be expected by the parties to extend, and did in fact extend, 
beyond the year. 
Id.  In the first reported case in England dealing with the one-year provision, Lord 
Holt seemed to suggest that the actual time for performance was the critical issue.  
Francam v. Foster, (1692) 90 Eng. Rep. 912 (K.B.) (discussed in Warner, 164 U.S. at 
421).  But in Peter v. Compton, a case considered by all of the judges, the majority of 
the judges concluded that a contract was only within the Statute if it was impossible 
for it to be performed with one year.  (1693) 90 Eng. Rep. 157, 157  (K.B.) (discussed 
in Warner, 164 U.S. at 421–22). 
 83 D & N Boening, Inc., 472 N.E.2d at 993; see also Willis, supra note 41, at 439 (“As 
interpreted by the courts this means any agreement that by its express terms cannot 
possibly be performed, either by one or by both parties, within one year from the 
making thereof . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also Warner, 164 U.S. at 434 (“The 
question is not what that probable, or expected, or actual performance of the con-
tract was; but whether the contract, according to the reasonable interpretation of its 
terms, required that it should not be performed within the year.”); 9 RICHARD A. 
LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 24:3, at 450–56 (4th ed. 1999) [hereinafter 
WILLISTON] (“A promise . . . is not within the Statute if at the time the contract is 
made there is a possibility in law and in fact that full performance such as the parties 
intended may be completed before the expiration of a year.” (footnote omitted)). 
 84 Deevy v. Porter, 95 A.2d 596, 597 (N.J. 1953). 
 85 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. a (1981). 
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ever, apply to performance by “abnormal and unusual methods not 
within the contemplation of the parties” when they entered into the 
contract.
86
  Also, “[d]espite prevailing views, one continues to find 
courts who are prepared to ‘look to the circumstances’ and bring 
within the statute oral agreements that might conceivably have been 
performed within a year.”
87
  Further, the contract must be capable of 
being performed within one year of its formation; thus, an employ-
ment contract for a one-year term, but which is to begin several days 
after formation, is not capable of being performed within a year.
88
 
A promise of performance during the life of a particular person 
is generally not within the Statute because the person might die with-
in a year of the contract’s formation.
89
  Similarly, “[a] promise of 
permanent personal performance is, on a fair interpretation, a prom-
ise of performance for life, and therefore not within the Sta-
tute . . . .”
90
  Also, under the “great weight of authority,”
91
 “[i]f the 
plaintiff’s part of the contract has been fully performed, the defen-
dant’s part becomes enforceable without regard to the period cov-
ered.”
92
  Termination as a result of breach is not, however, the same 





 86 9 WILLISTON, supra note 83, § 24:4, at 466–70. 
 87 DAWSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 913; see also Great Hill Fill & Gravel, Inc. v.  
Shapleigh, 692 A.2d 928, 929–30 (Me. 1997) (finding that the parties “plainly mani-
fested” an intention for performance to last more than one year). 
 88 Kass v. Ronnie Jewelry, Inc., 371 A.2d 1060, 1061–62 (R.I. 1977). 
 89 9 WILLISTON, supra note 83, § 24:4, at 476–79. 
 90 Id. § 24:5, at 480. 
 91 4 CORBIN, supra note 63, § 19.14, at 617. 
 92 Id. § 19.1, at 578–79.  This doctrine is different from the so-called “part per-
formance” doctrine and renders the promise enforceable at law, not simply in equity.  
Id. § 19.14, at 617.  “Part performance not amounting to full performance on one 
side does not in general take a contract out of the one-year provision.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. e (1981).  The application of the part-
performance doctrine is therefore beyond the scope of this Article. 
 93 See D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 992, 995 (N.Y. 
1984). 
[T]he commentators have long agreed that the mere possibility of a 
breach within the first year of an agreement does not constitute the 
possibility of some alternative performance which would take the 
agreement out of the Statute.  Clearly, termination of an agreement as 
a result of its breach is not performance thereof within the meaning of 
the Statute of Frauds, and an oral agreement which by its own terms 
must continue for more than a year unless terminated by its breach is 
void. 
Id.  (citations omitted) 
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The one-year provision was included in the First Restatement of 
Contracts, published in 1932.
94
  The First Restatement provides that 
the following contracts are unenforceable unless evidenced by a writ-
ing: “Bilateral contracts, so long as they are not fully performed by ei-
ther party, which are not capable of performance within a year from 
the time of their formation.”
95
  The First Restatement further pro-
vides that “[w]here any of the promises in a bilateral contract cannot 
be fully performed within a year from the time of the formation of 
the contract, all promises in the contract are within [the one-year 
provision], unless and until one party to such a contract completely 
performs what he has promised.”
96
  Under the First Restatement, 
promises in unilateral contracts
97
 are not within the one-year provi-
sion (such contracts being fully performed by one party at the time of 
formation).
98
  The First Restatement further provides that “[t]he fact 
that performance within a year is highly improbable or not expected 
by the parties does not bring a contract within the Statute.”
99
  Impor-
tantly, the First Restatement states that “[a] distinction must be taken 
between promises which can be ‘fully performed’ within a year and 
promises which though they cannot be ‘fully performed’ within that 
time may be excused within it by the happening of some event.”
100
 
The one-year provision was also included in the Second Res-
tatement of Contracts, published in 1981.
101
  The Second Restatement 
essentially tracks the language of the First Restatement, providing 
that “[w]here any promise in a contract cannot be fully performed 
within a year from the time the contract is made, all promises in the 
contract are within the Statute of Frauds until one party to the con-
tract completes his performance.”
102
  The Second Restatement pro-
vides that “the provision covers only those contracts whose perfor-
mance cannot possibly be completed within a year.”
103
  It further 
 
 94 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1932). 
 95 Id.  A bilateral contract is one in which both parties to the contract have made 
a promise.  See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 57 (6th ed. 
2009) (“[A] contract where both parties have made promises is bilateral.”). 
 96 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 198 (1932). 
 97 A unilateral contract is one in which only one party has made a promise, and 
the other party accepts the offer by performing.  See PERILLO, supra note 95, at 56–57. 
 98 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 198(1) cmt. a (1932). 
 99 Id. cmt. b. 
 100 Id. cmt. c. 
 101 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110(1)(e) (1981). 
 102 Id. § 130(1). 
 103 Id. cmt. a. 
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provides that where an agreement could be discharged by a power to 
cancel or performance might be excused by supervening events, even 
when such an event is identified in the contract as an excuse, such 
occurrences are not considered performance.
104
  The Second Res-
tatement states that “[t]his distinction between performance and 
excuse for nonperformance is sometimes tenuous; it depends on the 
terms and the circumstances, particularly on whether the essential 
purposes of the parties will be attained.”
105
 
Because the original grounds for enacting the Statute might no 
longer exist (i.e., distrust of a jury’s ability to recognize perjury and a 
court’s inability to control juries), commentators have sought to iden-
tify the reasons for its survival.  Common arguments include (1) the 
fact that a writing requirement promotes reflection by the parties be-
fore contracting (and presumably thereby increases the likelihood 
that contracts will be value-enhancing to each party and thus worthy 
of encouraging);
106
 (2) its use as a device for easily resolving disputes 
involving important transactions (a concern with reducing litigation 
expenses, which is a potential transaction cost associated with con-
tracting);
107
 (3) a way for courts to determine which agreements the 
parties intended to be binding (promoting autonomy of the par-
ties);
108
 (4) a desire to encourage parties to reduce their agreements 
to writing, because such agreements are easier for courts to interp-
ret,
109
 and the number and cost of trials will thereby be reduced 
(transaction costs);
110
 (5) increased literacy rates (the elimination of a 
basis for opposing a writing requirement);
111
 and (6) the modern de-
velopments of business, which include greater reliance on written 
records (the elimination of a basis for opposing a writing require-
ment).
112
  In addition, not surprisingly, continuing support for the 




 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 FRIEDRICH KESSLER, GRANT GILMORE & ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 756 (3d ed. 1986). 
 107 Id. 
 108 O’Connell, supra note 42, at 261. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 261–62 & 262 n.38. 
 111 Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 
747 (1931). 
 112 Id. 
 113 See Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 101, 118–19 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(Wyatt, J., dissenting). 
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Robert Braucher, the reporter for the Statute chapter of the Second 
Restatement, noted that “a cautious approach to the Statute of Frauds 
seems to be in harmony with American professional opinion.”
114
 
If one combines the likely reasons for the adoption in 1677 of 
the one-year provision with the likely reasons for the Statute’s survival 
in the United States, it can be concluded that the one-year provision 
(and its survival) is based on avoiding the litigation expenses and the 
risk of error involved in determining the truth of a party’s allegation 
that he or she was given an oral promise of long-term employment, 
along with a desire to insulate employers from long-term commit-
ments that were perhaps not given serious consideration by the em-
ployer. 
Most likely, those who dislike the Statute believe that it is used by 
parties with superior bargaining power to deceive weaker parties with 
impunity.  Under this theory, the weaker party either fears that re-
questing a written agreement will cause the stronger party not to pro-
ceed with the proposed transaction, or the weaker party is unsophis-
ticated and trusts the stronger party and therefore does not realize a 
written promise should be secured.  Then, when the weaker party 
sues for breach of the oral promise, the stronger party escapes liabili-
ty based on the Statute.  The Statute does not have a negative effect 
on stronger parties because their bargaining position and sophistica-
tion cause them to obtain written agreements when deemed advanta-
geous to them (often through the use of form contracts).  To persons 
who hold this theory, oral promises by employers to employees with 
respect to job security fit this description perfectly.  Accordingly, the 
Statute’s one-year provision is viewed as a pro-employer, pro-business 
device to enable employers to deceive employees with impunity. 
 
     The Statute of Frauds does not seem to be an “anachronism” for 
such cases as that at bar.  The oral lifetime employment contract was 
claimed by [the plaintiff] to have been made in a telephone conversa-
tion between him in California and [the defendant’s agent] in New 
York. The conversation was not recorded; no memoranda were made.  
The only testimony was, and could only be, that of [the plaintiff and 
the defendant’s agent].  Not only was [the plaintiff] a witness hostile to 
[the defendant, but so was the defendant’s agent, who had since been 
terminated].  Thus, [the defendant] was at the mercy of [the plaintiff 
and its former agent] in the sense that no person and no writing was 
available to confirm or contradict them; they alone had made the 
claimed oral contract and there was no writing. 
Id. 
 114 Robert Braucher, The Commission and the Law of Contracts, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 696, 
705 (1955). 
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Those who support the Statute most likely believe that it pre-
vents parties from fabricating oral promises and that it also precludes 
enforcement of promises that in most instances would not be con-
strued by reasonable persons as a commitment.  With respect to the 
former, persons who hold this view likely distrust the litigation 
process as a means of arriving at the truth, and are probably particu-
larly distrustful of the jury system.  At least with respect to cases 
brought by weaker parties against stronger parties, the jury might be 
inclined to sympathize with the weaker party and therefore find the 
existence of an oral promise even though the evidence is meager.  I 
suspect that persons who hold this view likely also believe that a per-
son who fails to obtain a promise in writing has been negligent and 
should pay the price for such carelessness.  The risk of error in such 
cases should be borne by the party whose fault it is that the evidence 
is unclear.  Also, one would expect that a party who had really been 
made a promise within the Statute’s various categories would have se-
cured it in writing. 
With respect to the Statute rendering unenforceable promises 
that in most instances would not be construed by reasonable persons 
as a commitment, the Statute operates as a rule as opposed to a stan-
dard, eliminating the cost of litigating cases where it is likely that a 
“promise,” as defined under contract law, has not even been made.
115
  
For example, if most promises for a long-term business (or employ-
ment) arrangement would not be construed as a binding commit-
ment in the absence of a written promise, it makes sense (if one is 
seeking to reduce litigation expenses) to render unenforceable all 
oral assurances of a long-term arrangement. 
Those who hold these views are likely to be businesses who dis-
trust their chances in front of a jury, who believe responsible persons 
reduce long-term and important commitments to writing, and who 





 115 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981) (“A promise is a ma-
nifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to 
justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.”). 
 116 See STEVEN VAGO, LAW & SOCIETY 285–87 (8th ed. 2006) (discussing so-called 
“repeat players” in litigation as opposed to so-called “one-shotters”). 
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III. THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE 
A. The Duration of Employment Relationships at English Common 
Law 
Under English common law, employment without an agreed 
term was presumed to be for one year, and this rule applied to all 
types of servants, though there were exceptions.
117
  Blackstone as-
serted that the yearly hiring rule was based “upon a principle of natu-
ral equity, that the servant shall serve, and the master maintain him, 
throughout all the revolutions of the respective seasons, as well when 
there is work to be done as when there is not.”
118
  Thus, the rule pre-
vented opportunism by precluding masters from discharging servants 




But the rule was not based solely on a concern for fairness be-
tween master and servant, and it was extended beyond agricultural 
servants.
120
  Rather, the one-year presumption “was designed to com-
pel labor and to control labor competition by restricting a worker’s 
mobility for annual periods” and to “minimize[] parochial relief rates 
by forcing the master to retain his servants during the months when 
they were unlikely to find alternative employment.”
121
  Accordingly, 
the presumption was a default provision presumably based both on 
what the parties would have agreed to had they considered the matter 
(a provision to prevent opportunism by either party) and on econom-
ic reasons (compelling workers to work, restricting labor competi-
tion, and reducing parochial relief rates).
122
 
Interestingly, this one-year presumption (which for the previous-
ly stated reasons implied a long-term employment relationship) 
would seem to conflict with the Statute’s one-year provision, which 
was perhaps concerned with employees fabricating oral promises of 
long-term employment.  In fact, the one-year presumption would 
seemingly render an oral employment contract unenforceable under 
the Statute’s one-year provision, unless employment began imme-
 
 117 Feinman, supra note 1, at 119–20; Summers, supra note 5, at 1082. 
 118 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413. 
 119 See Feinman, supra note 1, at 120; Bales, supra note 1, at 456. 
 120 See Feinman, supra note 1, at 120; Minda, supra note 3, at 968–69. 
 121 Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United 
States and England: An Historical Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L.J. 85, 90 (1982). 
 122 On filling gaps in contracts, see generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling 
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
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diately upon entering into the contract.  Such seemingly inconsistent 
purposes can be reconciled by concluding that one year was not con-
sidered a long term for an employment contract, but more than a 
year was, particularly with respect to employment and service con-
tracts, and by also concluding that such contracts were generally con-
sidered to be formed when services commenced (not sooner). 
The one-year-employment rule was merely a presumption, and 
the key issue was the parties’ intentions.
123
  Trade custom and the fre-
quency of wage payments were important considerations in determin-
ing the parties’ intentions and, as a result, the term of employment 
was often found to be less than a year.
124
  A strong presumption re-
mained, however, that the employment was for a specific term and 
not on an at-will basis.
125
  An express agreement for an at-will relation-
ship was necessary to rebut the presumption of employment for a de-
finite term, and an at-will relationship was considered an anomaly.
126
 
B. American Common Law Before the Late-Nineteenth Century 
The history of how employment relationships were treated by 
American courts has been the subject of extensive debate.  In fact, 
there is no consensus on how courts before the late-nineteenth cen-
tury approached the issue. 
Professor Jay Feinman has asserted that through the middle of 
the nineteenth century, the law in the United States was not as clear 
as English law.
127
  As stated by Professor Sanford M. Jacoby, 
“[d]ifferent courts might rule that an identical, indefinite contract 
was either presumptively annual, terminable at will or terminable at 
the end of a payment period.”
128
  Professor Clyde Summers has also 
recently asserted that “[b]y 1870, the law in the United States was 
confused, with courts going in diverse directions.”
129
  In contrast, Pro-
fessor Deborah Ballam has asserted that except for a brief time in the 
 
 123 Feinman, supra note 1, at 121; see also Summers, supra note 5, at 1082–83 (“This 
presumption of a yearly hiring could be rebutted by facts showing a contrary intent 
of the parties.”). 
 124 Summers, supra note 5, at 1083. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Feinman, supra note 1, at 122. 
 128 Jacoby, supra note 121, at 109. 
 129 Summers, supra note 3, at 67. 
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colonies, employment-at-will was the norm.
130
  Professor Summers has 
previously stated, however, that “[t]he English rule of presumed hir-
ing for a term was adopted by American courts . . . .”
131
 
C. Courts Adopt Wood’s Rule 
To the extent that the law was confused, in the late-nineteenth 
century the confusion started to lift.  In 1877, an Albany lawyer and 
treatise writer named Horace Gray Wood published a treatise on mas-
ter and servant law, and in it he maintained that the United States in-
flexibly followed the employment-at-will rule.  He stated, 
 With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring 
is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out 
a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof.  A 
hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time being spe-
cified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it 
was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the 
party may serve.  It is competent for either party to show what the 
mutual understanding of the parties was in reference to the mat-
ter; but unless their understanding was mutual that the service 
was to extend for a certain fixed and definite period, it is an inde-
finite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, and in 




Under what is now known as “Wood’s rule,”
133
 the employee had the 
burden of proving a term of employment, thereby reversing any pre-




Although Wood had not intended a mechanical application of 
the rule,
135
 the rule’s effect was to render most employment relation-
ships at will, instead of for a definite term.
136
  Thus, in the absence of 
 
 130 Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth Regarding Employment-at-Will: The 
True Origins of the Doctrine, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 94 (1996). 
 131 Summers, supra note 5, at 1083. 
 132 HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT COVERING 
THE RELATION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES § 134, at 272 
(1877) (footnotes omitted). 
 133 Minda, supra note 3, at 971. 
 134 Summers, supra note 5, at 1097; see also Jacoby, supra note 121, at 112 n.174 
(“Wood placed the burden of proof on the employee since the hiring was ‘prima facie 
a hiring at will.’”) (quoting WOOD, supra note 132, at 272). 
 135 Jacoby, supra note 121, at 112. 
 136 Summers, supra note 5, at 1097. 
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sufficient evidence to rebut the at-will presumption, the rule required 
a verdict for the employer.
137
  The rule also had “the effect of granting 
employers absolute control and power over the employment relation-




For the last several decades, commentators have debated wheth-
er Wood had support for his proposition and whether the cases he 
cited in support were on point.
139
  Some have argued that his proposi-
tion was an “aberration”
140
 and an “unfounded generalization of exist-
ing law.”
141
  Others have noted that in 1877 the at-will doctrine had 
already been adopted by seven states,
142
 and another commentator 




What is undisputed, however, is that by no later than the end of 
the 1930s, employment-at-will was the prevailing rule in the United 
States.
144
  The rule was primarily adopted by courts as a matter of 
 
 137 Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment-at-Will Rule Revisited, 23 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 733, 736 (1991). 
 138 Minda, supra note 3, at 982. 
 139 Compare J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job 
Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974) (no support), and Feinman, supra note 1, at 
126 (no support), and Summers, supra note 5, at 1083 (no support), and Summers, 
supra note 3, at 67 (“Wood’s Rule, by imposing a blanket presumption that all inde-
finite hirings were at will, misstated existing law.”), and Minda, supra note 3, at 970 
(“Commentators now agree that Wood invented his own rule.”), with Ballam, supra 
note 130, at 94 (“In actuality, with the exception of a brief period in early colonial 
times, employment-at-will has been the norm in the United States. . . . The only late-
nineteenth century change was that some courts stopped interpreting fixed-term 
agreements for payment of wages as an agreement to employ the worker for that 
same term.”), and Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of 
“Wood’s Rule” Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 552 (1990) (asserting that Wood’s cita-
tions supported his proposition). 
 140 Minda, supra note 3, at 982. 
 141 Summers, supra note 5, at 1097; see also St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 33 (assert-
ing that the at-will rule “sprang full-blown in 1877 from the busy and perhaps careless 
pen of an American treatise writer”). 
 142 Morriss, supra note 1, at 681. 
 143 Ballam, supra note 130, at 126. 
 144 See Bales, supra note 1, at 458, 460; Glendon & Lev, supra note 3, 457–58 (as-
serting that “by the end of the nineteenth century, nearly every American court had 
formally adopted the at-will rule”); Summers, supra note 3, at 68 (“[B]y 1930, the 
doctrine had become embedded in American law.”). 
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common law, not by statute,
145
 and Wood’s rule was accepted by 
courts uncritically
146
 and with little analysis.
147
 
Importantly, “a strong version of the [employment-at-will] rule 
came to be the dominant form.”
148
  As applied by the courts, it was 
difficult for employees to rebut the at-will presumption,
149
 and courts 
often refused to consider extraneous evidence of the parties’ inten-
tions.
150
  Thus, the rule was often more of an irrebuttable presump-
tion or a substantive rule of law that trumped the parties’ intentions 
than a rebuttable presumption.
151
  In fact, the rule, as applied by the 
courts, has been described as “virtually impermeable.”
152
  Under this 
strong version of the rule, even promises of “permanent” employ-
ment were presumed to be at will.
153
  Additional “superimposed spu-
rious doctrines,”
154
 such as mutuality of obligation, and the need for 
the employee to provide additional consideration beyond his or her 
services, strengthened the employment-at-will doctrine.
155
  One of the 
results of the strong version of the at-will rule was that employment 
termination cases based on an alleged breach of contract would rare-




 145 Bales, supra note 1, at 460. 
 146 Minda, supra note 3, at 986. 
 147 See Bales, supra note 1, at 460; Morriss, supra note 1, at 697; Summers, supra 
note 3, at 68; Shapiro & Tune, supra note 139, at 342. 
 148 Morriss, supra note 1, at 763. 
 149 Feinman, supra note 1, at 129. 
 150 Jacoby, supra note 121, at 116.  Professor Feinman has argued that “Wood’s 
rule represented a signal to the courts to view skeptically employees’ evidence of con-
tracts of long duration.”  Feinman, supra note 137, at 736. 
 151 Summers, supra note 5, at 1097; Summers, supra note 3, at 69. 
 152 Bales, supra note 1, at 461. 
 153 Summers, supra note 5, at 1097 n.66; see also Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 
266 N.W. 872 (Minn. 1936) (holding that the words “permanent employment” imply 
at-will relationship); Jacoby, supra note 121, at 117 (“The courts in most jurisdictions 
after 1890 held that contracts for ‘permanent’ or ‘lifetime’ employment were indefi-
nite as to duration and thus terminable at will.”). 
 154 Summers, supra note 5, at 1099. 
 155 Id. at 1097–99; see also Minda, supra note 3, at 963 (“The current rule of em-
ployment at-will is frequently defended on the principle of mutuality of obligations. 
If the employee can quit the relationship at any time and for any reason, it is argued, 
then the employer must be granted the mutual right of contract termination.”); 
Freed & Polsby, supra note 139, at 558 (noting that courts “applied the contract prin-
ciples of consideration and mutuality to conclude that an employee was not entitled 
to job security under an indefinite contract”). 
 156 Morriss, supra note 1, at 683. 
OGORMAN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2010  1:46 PM 
1048 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1023 
 
D. The Reasons for the Success of Wood’s Rule in the United States 
Commentators disagree on why the employment-at-will rule suc-
ceeded in the United States.  Some commentators have asserted that 
part of the reason the rule succeeded might have been because it was 
announced in “a modern, comprehensive treatise,” and it was “a clear 
rule of practical application . . . .”
157
  As one commentator stated, “the 
judicial adoption of the rule reflected the benefits to judges of a sim-




Other commentators have asserted the employment-at-will rule 
spread as part of the courts’ implementation of the general theory of 
contract developed by Christopher Columbus Langdell, Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, Jr., and Samuel Williston in the late-nineteenth and ear-
ly-twentieth centuries.
159
  The foundation of this general theory of 
contract was the freedom of the parties to structure their relationship 
as they saw fit.
160
  This general theory was an abstraction, and under it 
the contract’s subject matter should be irrelevant.
161
 
As Professor Feinman has noted, though, the employment-at-will 
doctrine, at least as applied by the courts, was a rejection of this gen-
eral theory of contract: 
The employment at will rule represent[ed] . . . a departure [from 
the general theory of contract] because the courts did not deal 
 
 157 Feinman, supra note 1, at 127. 
 158 Morriss, supra note 1, at 682. 
 159 See Bales, supra note 1, at 454 (“The prevailing wisdom is that the at-will rule 
spread because of a judiciary fixated, from about 1890 to 1930, on laissez-faire rea-
soning and freedom of contract.”); Freed & Polsby, supra note 139, at 558 (“Several 
courts identified freedom of contract as the predominant policy reason for employ-
ment at will . . . .”); Jacoby, supra note 121, at 116 (“Perhaps the most common ex-
planation for the courts’ embrace of the at will doctrine was the rise of a formalistic 
approach to contract interpretation.”); James A. Sonne, Firing Thoreau: Conscience and 
At-Will Employment, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 235, 235 (2007) (stating that the doc-
trine is “[r]ooted in freedom of contract and private property principles”); see also 
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 6 (1974) (“[T]he idea that there was such 
a thing as a general law—or theory—of contract seems never to have occurred to the 
legal mind until Langdell somehow stumbled across it.  It remained, of course, for 
Langdell’s successors [such as Holmes and Williston] to organize the great discovery, 
to map its outlines, and to plot its contours.”); Minda, supra note 3, at 977 (“By 1913, 
the contract justification for Wood’s Rule was accepted in New York and elsewhere as 
the general rationale governing at-will employment contracts.”). 
 160 Feinman, supra note 1, at 124–25; Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract 
Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1286 (1990). 
 161 See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 20–24 (1965); Feinman, 
supra note 1, at 125. 
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with the issue as a matter of pure doctrine; the fact that an em-
ployment contract was at stake made all the difference in the 
shaping of the law.  If the law on duration of service contracts had 
followed the teachings of pure contract theory, the agreement es-
tablished by the parties would have been enforced.  Thus the du-
ration of hiring and the notice required would have been open 
questions in each case to be decided without presumptions of ei-
ther yearly hiring or termination at will.  The period of payment 
and the business customs of which the parties would have been 
cognizant would be important factors . . . . But the contract ap-




Professor Summers concurs: “The employment at will doctrine is cast 
in contract language, but it has no basis in contract law.  The courts 
have not asked the basic contract question—what did the parties in-
tend?”
163
  Professor Feinman has also noted that it is unlikely that the 
spread of Wood’s rule was because employees and employers general-
ly presumed their relationships to be at will, pointing out that the 
rule was developed in response to cases brought by mid-level em-
ployees, relationships under which both employee and employer 
would have expected some degree of permanence.
164
 
The most common explanation for the rise of the employment-
at-will doctrine is the effect of economic factors.  Professor Ballam, 
who maintains that the employment-at-will rule was adopted in co-
lonial times,
165
 believes the English yearly hiring rule did not take 
hold in the colonies because most laborers were occasional or day la-
borers, indentured servants, or slaves to whom the yearly hiring rule 
was inapplicable.
166
  Also, a shortage of labor increased wages, and 
employers could generally not afford to be bound by a yearly hir-
ing.
167
  Further, most employers were small subsistence farmers who 
did not need permanent help, and the free laborers would not want 
to be bound for a year because they simply wanted to earn enough 
 
 162 Feinman, supra note 1, at 125. 
 163 Summers, supra note 5, at 1099. 
 164 Feinman, supra note 1, at 131–32; see also John Blackburn, Restricted Employer 
Discharge Rights: A Changing Conception of Employment at Will, 17 AM. BUS. L.J. 467, 482 
(1980) (asserting that the probable intent of employees and employers is that the 
employee will not be terminated without good cause); Summers, supra note 5, at 
1097 (“The new presumption was not based on any finding, or even assertion, that it 
expressed the way the parties in fact viewed their relationship.”). 
 165 Ballam, supra note 130, at 129. 
 166 Id. at 127. 
 167 Id. 
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Other commentators, most notably Professor Feinman, have 
taken the position that the rise of the employment-at-will doctrine 
was a result of the development of advanced capitalism.
169
  He main-
tains that the essential elements of advanced capitalism include an 
owner’s freedom to terminate employees and a division between capi-
tal and labor.
170
  He asserts that the rule succeeded because “judges 
were conservative people, trained in an environment that exalted the 
values of business,” and “Wood’s rule served the purposes of the 
owners of capital.”
171
  He maintains that the rule was “the ultimate gu-
arantor of the capitalist’s authority over the worker. . . . If employees 
could be dismissed on a moment’s notice, obviously they could not 
claim a voice in the determination of the conditions of work or the 
use of the product of their labor.”
172
  Also, the combination of severe 
business cycles, which were common in the late-nineteenth century, 
and the rule that permitted terminations without notice placed the 
burden of these cycles on employees, not the owners.
173
 
Other commentators have similarly asserted that economic fac-
tors were responsible for the employment-at-will doctrine’s spread.  
For example, two student authors argued in an influential student 
note that the spread was due to ideological conviction, namely a de-
sire to support “freedom of enterprise, which was considered to in-
clude the ‘fundamental right’ of the employer to discharge em-
ployees as he or she pleased.”
174
  Professor Jacoby has argued that the 
employment-at-will rule spread because trade unions were weak in 
the United States and could not secure a better rule from the courts, 
and the rule was applied to white-collar workers because they were 
not perceived as particularly higher in status than blue-collar work-
ers.
175
  Professor Summers argued, 
 
 168 Id. at 127–28. 
 169 See Feinman, supra note 1, at 131; see also St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 33 (stat-
ing that Wood’s “pronouncement was admirably suited to the zeitgeist of an emerging 
industrial nation”). 
 170 Feinman, supra note 1, at 134. 
 171 Id. at 135. 
 172 Id. at 132–33. 
 173 Id. at 134. 
 174 Shapiro & Tune, supra note 139, at 343 (footnote omitted). 
 175 Jacoby, supra note 121, at 119–26. 
OGORMAN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2010  1:46 PM 
2010] ORAL PROMISES OF JOB SECURITY 1051 
 
The assumption is that the employee is only a supplier of labor 
who has no legal interest or stake in the enterprise other than the 
right to be paid for labor performed.  The employer, as owner of 
the enterprise, is legally endowed with the sole right to determine 
all matters concerning the operation of the enterprise.
176
 
Professor Richard Bales recently argued that once a handful of 
under-industrialized states adopted the rule, “other such states would 
have felt economic pressure to follow suit to avoid being left behind 
in attracting capital.  The industrialized states would then have felt 
similar pressure to adopt the rule to maintain their competitive ad-
vantage in the labor market.”
177
 
Professors Mayer Freed and Daniel Polsby argued that “[t]he 
employment-at-will rule was the natural offspring of a capitalist eco-
nomic order, reflecting the value of individualism, the growth of 
competition and the mobility of labor.”
178
  Professors Mary Ann Glen-
don and Edward R. Lev similarly asserted that the doctrine “was high-
ly compatible with prevailing laissez-faire notions . . . .”
179
  Professor 
Summers noted, however, that “a principle of limited government in-
tervention can not explain why one presumption rather than another 
is to be imposed; neutral interpretation of the parties’ intent would 
be more appropriate to laissez faire.”
180
 
Professor Gary Minda argued that by the early-nineteenth cen-
tury, employment contracts “became ‘fused’ with master-servant con-
cepts, which emphasized the importance of a servant’s loyalty to his 
master, the need for authoritarian control, and the idea that the em-
ployment relation must serve the needs of the enterprise.”
181
  He ar-
gued that although the master-servant relationship originated in con-
tract, it was considered a legal status.
182
  It has also been suggested, 
however, that “in its day the [at-will] rule could be seen as a ‘progres-
 
 176 Summers, supra note 3, at 65. 
 177 Bales, supra note 1, at 465. 
 178 Freed & Polsby, supra note 139, at 558. 
 179 Glendon & Lev, supra note 3, at 458; see also Sonne, supra note 159, at 243 
(“[T]here is no question its opposition to the English presumption of one-year hir-
ing captured the laissez-faire spirit of both the legal and business cultures of the time 
. . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 180 Summers, supra note 3, at 68. 
 181 Minda, supra note 3, at 986. 
 182 Id. 
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sive reaction to the status concepts’ that had governed the employ-
ment relation in the past.”
183
 
Professor Andrew P. Morriss argued that the rise of the at-will 
rule was not the result of industrialization
184
 or judicial class preju-
dice.
185
  He based his conclusion on the fact that the first states to 
adopt the at-will rule were in the under-industrialized West and 
South.
186
  Thus, he concluded that the rule was adopted to keep such 
disputes out of the courts because of courts’ limited capacity “to eva-




In sum, it is likely that the spread of the at-will rule, like the 
adoption of the Statute’s one-year provision, was the result of mul-
tiple factors, including (1) notions of autonomy and freedom of con-
tract (in the sense that a failure to agree on job security means an ab-
sence of consent to anything other than an at-will relationship); (2) a 
desire to retain employer and employee flexibility in order to pro-
mote wealth maximization (with the parties retaining the right to dis-
continue the relationship if it became unprofitable for one of the 
parties, or a more profitable alternative became available); and (3) a 
desire to keep out of the court system cases that are difficult from an 
evidentiary standpoint. 
E. The Employment-at-Will Rule in Modern Times 
The so-called “strong version” of the at-will doctrine remained 
common through the 1950s.
188
  Starting in the late 1950s, however, 
exceptions to the at-will doctrine began to arise.
189
  Some courts 
sought to move toward pure contract theory and return Wood’s rule 
to its original intent, which was as a rebuttable presumption of at-will 
status, and to make use of implied-in-fact contracts and reliance to 
render promises of job security enforceable.
190
  For example, courts 
today are more likely to enforce promises of job security made orally 
 
 183 Glendon & Lev, supra note 3, at 458 (quoting Daniel A. Mathews, Note, A 
Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1438 
(1975)). 
 184 See Morriss, supra note 1, at 681. 
 185 See id. at 682. 
 186 See id. at 701. 
 187 Id. at 762. 
 188 Bales, supra note 1, at 458. 
 189 Id. at 459. 
 190 Minda, supra note 3, at 951. 
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or in employment handbooks.
191
  But “[t]his approach has not pro-
vided a major exception to the common law rule because courts have 
narrowly defined the facts and circumstances needed to rebut the 
normal presumption that employment is terminable at will.”
192
 
Courts have also created a “public policy exception” to the at-will 
doctrine, under which tort claims are recognized for terminations of 
employment that are detrimental to a clearly articulated public poli-
cy.
193
  However, “courts frequently require that the discharge actually 
violate some clear and specific statement of public policy found with-
in state law.  Hence, unless some specific statutory provision has been 
violated, most courts have refused to apply the public policy excep-
tion to the common law rule.”
194
  Some courts have also recognized 
an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the em-
ployment-at-will relationship,
195
 but most courts have rejected this ap-
proach.
196
  Congress and the state legislatures have created numerous 
statutory exceptions, including prohibitions on terminations based 
on protected characteristics such as race and sex,
197
 or based on un-
ion activity
198
 or whistle blowing
199
 to name just a few. 
But importantly, the exceptions to the employment-at-will doc-
trine have not fundamentally altered the rule itself.  The exceptions 
generally apply to a termination for a specific, improper reason and 
do not create a general “good cause” or “just cause” requirement for 
terminations, like those that exist in most collective bargaining 
agreements.  For employees who have been terminated because they 
allegedly did not perform well, or allegedly broke a workplace rule, 
the at-will rule will apply, and there will generally be no claim for 
wrongful termination. 
One commentator recently recognized, “[D]espite these restric-
tions on employer discretion, the employee protections are excep-
tions that coexist with the rule of at-will employment.  For the most 
 
 191 Bales, supra note 1, at 459. 
 192 Minda, supra note 3, at 951. 
 193 Id. at 951–52. 
 194 Id. at 952. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 953. 
 197 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 
(2006). 
 198 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006). 
 199 See, e.g., Whistleblower Law, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1421–1428 (West 
2009). 
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part, employers still retain broad firing discretion.”
200
  As stated by 
Professor Summers, “[t]he exceptions were narrowly restricted 
and . . . [t]he employer’s divine right to dismiss at any time, for any 
reason, and without notice has survived with vigor.”
201
  The employ-
ment-at-will “doctrine has been, and still is, a basic premise under-
girding American labor law.”
202
  Professor Summers stated, 
 What has emerged is that judicially created exceptions to the ri-
gid employment at will doctrine, which had the potential for pro-
viding employees, especially long time employees, with substantial 
protection from unfair dismissals, have been so grudgingly ap-
plied by most courts, that they are little more than paper shields 
against arbitrary employer actions.  The dominant judicial pers-
pective is that employers should have unfettered freedom to de-
termine who should be employed and that workers are subordi-




As one commentator has recently noted, “[w]hat recent years have 
not seen . . . is the long-predicted death of employment at will.”
204
  
Summers has argued that the employment-at-will rule continues to 
“draw[] its strength from the deeply rooted conception of the em-
ployment relation as a dominant-servient relation rather than one of 
mutual rights and obligations.  The employer, as owner of the enter-
prise, is viewed as owning the job with a property right to control the 
job and the worker . . . .”
205
 
IV. CASES INVOLVING THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
TO ORAL PROMISES OF JOB SECURITY 
Courts that have addressed the application of the Statute’s one-
year provision to oral promises of job security have reached conflict-
ing results as to whether the Statute bars the enforcement of such 
promises.
206
  Of course, “[t]he general rule, almost universally ad-
 
 200 Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment 
Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 79 (2007). 
 201 Summers, supra note 3, at 73. 
 202 Id. at 65. 
 203 Id. at 77. 
 204 Scott A. Moss, Where There’s At-Will, There Are Many Ways: Redressing the Increasing 
Incoherence of Employment at Will, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 295, 300 (2005) (emphasis add-
ed). 
 205 Summers, supra note 3, at 78. 
 206 See BALES, HIRSCH & SECUNDA, supra note 1, at 48 (“The statute of frauds is diffi-
cult to apply to employment cases, and courts (often within the same jurisdiction) 
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hered to, is that a contract for personal services which by its terms is 
not to be performed within a year must be in writing.”
207
  Thus, an 
oral employment contract under which an employer and an em-
ployee each promise an employment relationship for a definite term 
to last more than one year from the contract’s formation is without 
question barred by the Statute if there is no possibility of early termi-
nation other than as a result of a total material breach.
208
 
But alleged oral promises of job security are not always bilateral 
contracts under which an employer and an employee each agree to a 
definite term of employment, subject only to early termination as a 
result of a party’s total material breach.
209
  For example, an employer 
might promise employment for a specific duration, but the employee 
might retain the right to quit at any time.
210
  Or an employer’s prom-
ise of a definite term of employment might be construed as including 
the right of the employer to terminate the relationship within a year 
for reasons other than the employee’s total material breach.  For ex-
ample, even without an explicit right to terminate the employment 
relationship during the term of employment, an employer generally 
has an implied-in-fact right to terminate the relationship for “just 
cause.”
211
  Or either party might retain the right to terminate the con-
 
are inconsistent.”); JEFFREY FERRIELL & MICHAEL NAVIN, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS 
301 (2004) (“Such long term contracts have been viewed in conflicting ways, with 
some courts treating ‘termination’ as an excuse, similar to death, and others treating 
termination as a means of alternative performance.” (footnote omitted)). 
 207 French v. Sabey Corp., 951 P.2d 260, 262 (Wash. 1998). 
 208 See, e.g., Trum v. Melvin Pierce Marine Coating, Inc., 562 So. 2d 235 (Ala. 
1990) (oral employment contract for four years); Richard A. Naso & Assocs. v. Diffu-
sion, 390 S.E.2d 106, 108 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (oral employment contract for five 
years); Cunnison v. Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc., 485 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1985) (oral employment contract for five years); Garg v. Venkataraman, 
561 N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (oral employment agreement for ten 
years); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. b, illus. 5 (1981) (oral em-
ployment contract for five years); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 198 cmt. d, 
illus. 3 (1932) (oral employment contract for thirteen months); 9 WILLISTON, supra 
note 83, § 24.1, at 438 (“A contract to serve for a period extending more than a year 
beyond the time of making the contract is uniformly held within the Statute.”).  A 
party has a right to terminate or cancel a contract in response to a “total material 
breach” by the other party.  FERRIEL & NAVIN, supra note 206, at 450.  A “total materi-
al breach” is a material breach if it “cannot be cured or if a reasonable time for cure 
has expired.”  Id. 
 209 In fact, one would think that most agreements of this kind would be in writing. 
 210 See, e.g., Deevy v. Porter, 95 A.2d 596, 596 (N.J. 1953) (agreement for one-year 
employment term, subject to the right of the employee to quit at any time). 
 211 Short v. Columbus Rubber & Gasket Co., Inc., 535 So. 2d 61, 66 (Miss. 1988) 
(citing Masonite Corp. v. Handshoe, 44 So. 2d 41, 43 (Miss. 1950)).  As stated by one 
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tract upon a certain amount of notice.
212
  Or an employer might 
promise employment not for a definite term, but for as long as the 
employee is performing satisfactorily.
213
  In such cases, the application 
of the Statute becomes complicated. 
In these cases, the question is whether “performance” can occur 
within one year as a result of the right to terminate the employment 
relationship.  The answer to this question depends on the characteri-
zation of the event that permits termination within a year.  If the 
event is a breach or an excuse for nonperformance, the contract is 
within the Statute.
214
  But if performance has already occurred by the 
time of the event (or if the event is itself the completion of perfor-




As discussed below, some courts construe “performance” narrow-
ly and hold that if the parties intended an employment relationship 
for longer than one year from the contract’s formation, a right by ei-
ther party to terminate the relationship sooner is not a defense to the 
Statute “because although defeasance is possible within a year perfor-
mance is not.”
216
  Other courts, however, view “performance” more 
broadly and hold that such a right to early termination takes the con-




court, under an employment contract, it is assumed that the parties intended for the 
employee to “conform to the usual standards expected of an employee, and that he 
would render honest, faithful and loyal service in accordance with his ability.  If there 
is a willful and substantial failure to adhere to those standards it would be justifiable 
cause for the employer to discharge him.” Chiodo v. Gen. Waterworks Corp., 413 
P.2d 891, 892 (Utah 1966) (footnote omitted). 
 212 See, e.g., French v. Sabey Corp., 951 P.2d 260, 261 (Wash. 1998) (five-year em-
ployment contract that could be terminated upon six months’ notice). 
 213 See, e.g., Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(promise of permanent employment as long as the employee did not “screw[] up 
badly,” though majority construed the promise as one giving the employer the right 
to terminate for “just cause”); Hetes v. Schefman & Miller Law Office, 393 N.W.2d 
577, 577 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (alleged promise to employ plaintiff as long as she 
did “a good job”). 
 214 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130(1) & cmt. a (1981). 
 215 Id. § 130. 
 216 PERILLO, supra note 95, at 668. 
 217 Id. at 669.  Interestingly, New York has a “peculiar variation” on the rule.  Id.  
Under the New York rule, “the Statute does not apply if the option to terminate is 
bilateral or if the option is in the defendant, but the Statute would be a defense if the 
option of termination is only in the plaintiff.”  Id.  For example, in Harris v. Home In-
demnity Co., the court refused to enforce an oral promise of permanent employment 
“where the right to cancel or terminate is limited unilaterally to plaintiff.”  175 
N.Y.S.2d 603, 603 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958).  The court’s rationale was that “in such cases 
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A. Courts Construing “Performance” Narrowly 
Perhaps the leading case finding that exercising the right to 
terminate the employment relationship within a year is not “perfor-
mance” is Deevy v. Porter,
218
 decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in 1953.  In Deevy, the plaintiff, as assignee of a claim, alleged that the 
defendants promised to employ the assignors (a husband and wife) 
for one year, with employment to start at some point after the con-
tract was made, but that the employees “could quit at any time.”
219
  
Even though the employees could quit at any time, the court held 
that the agreement was within the Statute because “the parties bar-
gained for a fixed-term employment agreement not to be performed 
within one year from its making,”
220
 and that “the employees’ prom-
ise, as allegedly given, could likewise not be fully performed within 
the year, even though upon the exercise of their option to ‘quit at 
any time’ nonperformance thereafter would legally be excused.”
221
 
The court, with little elaboration or analysis, presumed that the 
employees had made promises to work for a year, and that if the em-
ployees quit before that time, they would have failed to perform, 
though it would not have been a breach but excusable nonperfor-
mance.
222
  The court relied on cases holding that an option to termi-
nate a contract at the will of a party was the equivalent of rescission, 
not performance.
223
  As stated by one court, even though the em-
ployee has the right to terminate the relationship within one year, “it 
is significant that the agreement establishes a contemplated term, 
and the plaintiff’s departure would cut that term short, thereby fru-




defendant’s liability endures indefinitely, subject only to the uncontrolled voluntary 
act of the party who seeks to hold defendant.  Under such circumstances it is illusory, 
from the point of view of defendant, to consider the contract terminable or perform-
able within one year.”  Id.  The court then noted that “it is to the party to be charged, 
alone, namely the defendant, that the statute is designed to provide protection from 
fraud and perjury.”  Id. 
 218 95 A.2d 596 (N.J. 1953). 
 219 Id. at 596. 
 220 Id. at 598–99. 
 221 Id. at 599. 
 222 Id. 
 223 See id. at 598 (citing Wagniere v. Dunnell, 73 A. 309, 310 (R.I. 1909)). 
 224 Lamaster v. Chi. & Ne. Ill. Dist. Council, 766 F. Supp. 1497, 1508 (N.D. Ill. 
1991). 
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Another leading decision adopting a similar view is the 1959 U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decision in Coan v. Orsinger.
225
  
In Coan, the plaintiff alleged that he was orally promised the job of 
resident manager of an apartment development, and that the job was 
to last until he completed law school (which he had just started) or 
until he was obliged to discontinue those studies.
226
  A little over a 
month later he was terminated.
227
  The majority held that the plain-
tiff’s claim was barred by the Statute, despite the plaintiff’s argument 
that the contract could be completed within one year since he might 
be obliged to discontinue his law studies because of poor grades or 
other reasons.
228
  The majority reasoned as follows: 
 That contingency contemplates an annulment of the terms of 
the contract and would operate as a defeasance, thereby terminat-
ing and discharging the contract.  Further performance under 
the contract would be impossible by either party.  This annulment 
or defeasance provision does not contemplate the performance of 
the contract but only its termination and cancellation.  Although 
it could be annulled within a year, it was none the less a personal 
service contract to last for more than a year, e.g., until appellant 
completed his studies at Georgetown University Law School.  Al-
though this annulment or defeasance provision relieves the par-
ties from further performance of the contract, it is not the type of 
performance that is necessary to take the case out of the operation 
of the statute. 
 . . . . 
 The courts . . . recognize a distinct difference between a contin-
gency which fulfills the terms of a contract and one which pre-
vents fulfillment.  If the contingency which fulfills and completes 
the terms of the contract happens or could possibly happen with-
in a year, the contract is not within the statute.  On the other 
hand, if the contingency prevents or discharges the parties from 
performing their obligations under the contract within a year, 
then the contract is within the statute.
229
 
The court then concluded that the contract was for personal services 
in excess of a year, subject to the right to annulment that might occur 
sooner.
230
  The court held that “this in no way helps to further the 
 
 225 265 F.2d 575. 
 226 Id. at 575–76. 
 227 Id. at 576. 
 228 Id. at 576–77. 
 229 Id. at 577, 578. 
 230 Id. 
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performance of the contract but rather serves to defeat it, rendering 




The dissent argued that the contract provided for two alternative 
methods of performance.  The dissent asserted that “[t]he contract 
called for performance until appellant ‘was obliged to discontinue’ 
his studies.  This contingency did not defeat the contract; it simply 
advanced a basis upon which it could be carried out.”
232
 
In French v. Sabey Corp., the Washington Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether an employment contract for a five-year term, but 
with the right of either party to terminate the employment relation-
ship on six months’ notice, was within the Statute.
233
  The court ruled 
that the contract was barred by the Statute because the right to ter-
minate on six months notice would constitute the defeasance of the 
contract, not its performance.
234
 
Courts have also held that an employer’s right to terminate the 
employment relationship for cause constitutes a termination as a re-
sult of a breach, and the contract therefore remains within the Sta-
tute.  For example, in Haigh v. Matsushita Electric Corp., the plaintiff 
alleged that he had been orally promised employment until he re-
tired (which would be in twenty-one years).
235
  The court held that a 
termination for cause would result from the employee breaching his 




Similarly, in Windsor v. Aegis Services, Ltd., the plaintiff alleged 
that his supervisor orally promised him that he would have “a job as 
long as he did not violate the standards of conduct noted in an em-
ployee handbook given to [him] after he began his employment.”
237
  
After the plaintiff’s employer terminated him, he filed suit for wrong-
ful termination, asserting that his employer terminated him without 
just cause.
238
  The district court granted the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the Statute barred the oral promise 
 
 231 Coan, 265 F.2d at 578. 
 232 Id. at 580 (Danaher, J., dissenting). 
 233 French v. Sabey Corp., 951 P.2d 260, 261 (Wash. 1998). 
 234 Id. at 263. 
 235 Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 676 F. Supp. 1332, 1346 (E.D. Va. 1987). 
 236 Id. at 1348. 
 237 Windsor v. Aegis Servs., Ltd., 691 F. Supp. 956, 957 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff’d, 869 
F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 238 Id. at 956–57. 
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because it could not be performed within one year.
239
  The court con-
cluded that termination of the employment relationship for violating 
the standards of conduct does not constitute performance.
240
  The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed on the basis of 
the district court’s reasoning.
241
 
These courts adopt a narrow interpretation of “performance,” 
concluding that a right to terminate the employment relationship 
within a year is either the defeasance of the contract or the right to 
cancel based on a total material breach.  Under such an approach, 
courts have little difficulty concluding that the Statute bars the oral 
promise. 
B. Courts Construing “Performance” Broadly 
The other view treats an option to terminate within a year as an 
alternative method of performance.  For example, in Fothergill v. 
McKay Press, the court strongly suggested that the Statute would pose 
no bar to an oral employment contract providing for five years’ em-
ployment but terminable by either party upon six months’ notice.
242
  
In Taylor v. Canteen Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit held that “[w]here . . . the promise of employment is cast in 
terms of lasting as long as the employee wants the job, the promise is 




Courts have also held that an employer’s right to terminate the 
employment relationship for “just cause” includes the right to termi-
nate for reasons other than the employee’s breach.  The leading de-
cision adopting this approach is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit decision in Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.
244
 
In Ohanian, the plaintiff alleged that the employer orally prom-
ised him that he would not be fired “unless [he] screwed up badly.”
245
  
After the employer fired the plaintiff, the plaintiff brought suit for 
breach of the alleged oral promise,
246
 and the defendant argued that 
 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. at 960. 
 241 Windsor v. Aegis Servs., Inc., 869 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 242 Fothergill v. McKay Press, 106 N.W.2d 215, 220 (Mich. 1960). 
 243 Taylor v. Canteen Corp., 69 F.3d 773, 785 (7th Cir 1995). 
 244 779 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying New York law). 
 245 Id. at 104 (alteration in original). 
 246 Id. 
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the Statute’s one-year provision barred the suit.
247
  Importantly, the 
court construed the promise as permitting the employer to terminate 
the employee for “just cause” rather than for “screwing up badly.”
248
  
The court then concluded that under New York law, “just cause can 
be broader than breach and here there may be just cause to dismiss 
without a breach.”
249
  For example, despite the plaintiff’s best efforts, 
it might be necessary to terminate the plaintiff’s employment because 
of adverse market conditions that necessitate “a change in [the em-
ployer’s] business strategy, perhaps reducing or closing an opera-
tion.”
250
  Accordingly, the court held that the Statute did not bar the 
oral promise because the employment relationship could have been 




Similarly, in Frazier v. Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, the plain-
tiff alleged that his employer had given him oral assurances that he 
would only be terminated for cause.
252
  The court rejected the em-
ployer’s Statute defense, asserting without analysis that the plaintiff 
“could have been discharged for good cause within a year of having 
been hired,” and the contract therefore could have been performed 
within a year.
253
  The court did not address whether the plaintiff had 
the right to terminate the employment relationship within one year. 
V. SHOULD ORAL PROMISES OF JOB SECURITY GENERALLY BE BARRED 
BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS? 
A. Broad or Narrow Interpretation of “Performance”? 
The stakes involved regarding this issue are clear.  If a narrow 
conception of “performance” is applied, fewer oral promises of job 
security will be enforced.  If a broad conception of “performance” is 
applied, more oral promises of job security will be enforced.  As with 
any difficult legal issue, there are factors pulling in each direction. 
 
 247 Id. at 105–06. 
 248 Id. at 107. 
 249 Id. at 108. 
 250 Ohanian, 779 F.2d at 108. 
 251 Id. 
 252 574 F. Supp. 318, 320 (E.D. Va. 1983).  Frazier was presumably overruled by the 
Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Windsor v. Aegis Services, Inc., 869 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1989) 
 253 Id. 
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As an initial matter, the issue involves one of statutory construc-
tion.  Thus, the plain language of the Statute should be followed.
254
  
But this will not resolve every case because the Statute does not de-
fine “performance.”  Legislative history could be consulted, but no 
relevant legislative history exists.
255
 
As previously discussed, however, the best interpretation of the 
one-year provision’s purpose is that it was aimed primarily at em-
ployment and service contracts, and it was aimed at such contracts for 
a variety of reasons, including that (1) it was unusual to have such an 
arrangement in excess of one year; (2) it was often difficult to deter-
mine the truth in such cases since they were often brought long after 
the alleged oral promise was made (for example, when the employee 
or employer terminated the relationship after the typical one-year pe-
riod had elapsed); (3) the risk of error in such cases would be of par-
ticular concern because the remedy for a breach of a long-term con-
tract was likely to be substantial; and (4) it simply was not good policy 
to hold a person to such a long-term contract, particularly when the 
person had not reduced it to writing and thus perhaps had not given 
it the desired contemplation.
256
  These rationales support a narrow in-
terpretation of “performance” in employment cases, and thus a more 
expansive application of the Statute. 
As several leading employment law commentators have noted, 
[I]t is easy for a fired employee to allege that she received an oral 
promise of lengthy employment, and such a promise is often dif-
ficult for an employer to disprove.  The possibility that the em-
ployee will testify fraudulently—or at least “remember” the facts 
in a particularly favorable light after learning from her lawyer that 
she is otherwise an at-will employee subject to summary dismis-
sal—is a real one.
257
 
Just as in the seventeenth century, it might be perceived that defen-
dants are at a disadvantage before a jury in such cases, particularly 
because the employee might have more sympathy with the jury than 
the employer. 
 
 254 See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 681, 685 (2009) (“As with any question of 
statutory interpretation, our analysis begins with the plain language of the statute.  It 
is well established that, when the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it ac-
cording to its terms.” (citations omitted)). 
 255 Cf. Perillo, supra note 61, at 77 (“No one knows why agreements not performa-
ble within a year were selected to be within the statute.”). 
 256 See supra Part II. 
 257 BALES, HIRSCH & SECUNDA, supra note 1, at 49. 
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Additionally, as previously discussed, the at-will rule—despite 
some erosion—remains the basic premise underlying employment 
law.
258
  The rule therefore continues to implement the reasons it was 
likely adopted, including (1) notions of autonomy and freedom of 
contract (in the sense that a failure to agree on job security means an 
absence of consent to anything other than an at-will relationship); (2) 
a desire to retain employer and employee flexibility to promote 
wealth maximization; and (3) a desire to keep difficult evidentiary 
cases out of the court system.
259
  Notably, some of the likely reasons 
for adopting the at-will rule are similar to the likely reasons for the 
one-year provision of the Statute, including a desire to keep difficult 
cases from an evidentiary standpoint out of the court system, a desire 
to avoid binding parties to lengthy contractual relationships, and a 
desire to ensure that parties are not subject to contractual arrange-
ments they never agreed to.  Thus, the continuing vitality of the em-
ployment-at-will rule also supports a narrow definition of “perfor-
mance.” 
Accordingly, the likely purposes of the Statute’s one-year provi-
sion and the employment-at-will rule dictate a narrow interpretation 
of “performance.”  But while it is true that the Statute has been 
treated like common law,
260
 it remains a statute, and the Statute 
makes reference to “performed.”
261
  Thus, the plain meaning of “per-
formance” should be applied, and only in what could be referred to 
as “close” or “doubtful” cases should deference be given to the likely 
purposes of the Statute and the employment-at-will doctrine. 
 
 258 See supra Part III.E. 
 259 See supra Part III.D. 
 260 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 78, at 205 (“In one sense, the statute of frauds was 
hardly a statute at all. It was so heavily warped by ‘interpretation’ that it had become 
little more than a set of common-law rules, worked out in detail by the common law 
courts.”).  Professor Grant Gilmore stated that the Statute is a celebrated example of 
an obsolescent statute being “reabsorbed within the mainstream of the common 
law.”  GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (1977).  I believe that such an 
approach by courts to a statute is illegitimate, and has no role in statutory interpreta-
tion (assuming it could be called “interpretation”), even if the statute at issue is one 
whose origins date back to 1677.  If the statute is obsolete, it is the legislature’s role 
to revise or repeal it.  Such a statute should be applied according to its plain mean-
ing, with deference to its likely purpose in close cases.  With respect to the Statute, I 
have accepted for purposes of this Article the court-imposed revisions to the Statute 
because it is unlikely these revisions will be abandoned.  I believe, however, that any 
further court-imposed revisions to the Statute should be avoided. 
 261 See An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 4 
(Eng.). 
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B. Determining If “Performance” Can Occur Within One Year 
The starting point for courts is therefore to determine what con-
stitutes “performance,” under a plain meaning approach, by each 
party under the alleged oral contract for job security.  This requires a 
careful analysis of what each party bargained for as part of the ex-
change.
262
  Importantly, as discussed below, under such an analysis, 
many oral contracts for job security will be taken out of the Statute 
because they will be so-called unilateral contracts, under which per-
formance by the employee is complete at the same time the contract 
is formed.  Therefore, only the remaining oral contracts for job secu-
rity that can be construed as bilateral are potentially subject to the 
Statute. 
1. Unilateral Contracts 
To properly analyze a Statute issue involving an oral promise of 
job security, the court must first determine what the employer bar-
gained for in exchange for its alleged promise of job security.
263
  Un-
der this analysis, a significant number of employer promises of job se-
curity will be taken out of the Statute because it will be determined 
that the employer bargained for a return performance, not a return 
promise.
264
  In such a case, the contract will be a unilateral contract, 
and thus outside the Statute.
265
 
As stated by the Michigan Supreme Court: 
[T]he typical employment agreement is unilateral in nature.  
Generally, the employer makes an offer or promise which the 
employee accepts by performing the act upon which the promise 
is expressly or impliedly based.  The employer’s promise consti-
tutes, in essence, the terms of the employment agreement; the 
employee’s action or forbearance in reliance upon the employer’s 
promise constitutes sufficient consideration to make the promise 
legally binding.  In such circumstances, there is no contractual 
 
 262 Whether promissory estoppel can be used to circumvent the Statute is beyond 
the scope of this Article.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(1) (1981) 
(providing that a promissory estoppel claim is not precluded by the Statute).  But see 
Stearns v. Emery-Waterhouse Co., 596 A.2d 72, 74–75 (Me. 1991) (rejecting use of 
promissory estoppel in employment context to circumvent the Statute). 
 263 See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. 
1980). 
 264 See id. at 900; see also Nitz v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 17098, 1995 WL 
500073, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1995) (noting that employment contracts are 
“often” unilateral contracts). 
 265 PERILLO, supra note 95, at 670. 
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requirement that the promisee do more than perform the act 




For example, if an employer orally promises an employee that the 
employer will only terminate the employment relationship if the em-
ployee does not perform satisfactorily, it is possible that the employee 
has not made a return promise in exchange.  Rather, the employer 
might simply have bargained for the employee to start work with the 
employer.  If that is the case, the employee’s performance is com-
plete at the same time the contract is formed (even if the employee 
has the right to keep working for a longer period), and the employ-
er’s promise is therefore outside of the Statute.  Of course, if the em-
ployee has not yet performed, he or she has not yet accepted the em-
ployer’s offer, and no Statute issue arises because no contract has 
been formed yet.  Also, whether an employer’s promise in circums-





 remains a separate issue to be re-
solved. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to address when an employ-
er’s promise of job security should be construed as inviting a return 
promise or a return performance.  But the important point is that 
such an analysis must be made when determining if an employer’s 
promise is barred by the Statute.  Only if it is determined that an em-
ployer’s promise was given in exchange for a return promise by the 
employee, thus constituting a bilateral contract, is the Statute a po-
tential bar.
269
  Although return promises can be implied from the cir-
cumstances,
270
 courts must be cautious about implying return promis-
es simply to set up the Statute as a potential bar.  Implying a return 
 
 266 Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 900 (footnote omitted). 
 267 See, e.g., Montgomery County Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 
1998) (holding that employer’s oral assurance to employee that she would remain 
employed as long as she did a good job was too indefinite to constitute an offer). 
 268 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 cmt. a, illus. 2 (1981) 
(promise to employ agent for three years unenforceable when promise “reserves 
power to terminate the agreement at any time”).  But see Summers, supra note 5, at 
1098 (“The employee, by coming to work, provides sufficient consideration to make 
the employer’s promise of continued or permanent employment binding.  An offer 
by an employer to employ so long as there is a need and the employee’s performance 
is satisfactory can be viewed as an offer of a unilateral contract. . . .’”). 
 269 PERILLO, supra note 95, at 670. 
 270 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) (“A promise may be 
stated in words either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly or partly from con-
duct.”). 
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promise by an employee in one case to set up the Statute as a bar will 
result in the case being used as a precedent in a subsequent case by 
an employer suing the employee for breach of such an implied prom-
ise.  The legal theory that is used as a defense in one case will be used 
as a claim in another case. 
2. Bilateral Contracts 
The Statute therefore only applies to those remaining employer 
oral promises for job security that were given in exchange for a re-
turn promise.  The question then becomes, what were the promises 
that were exchanged?  This must be determined to evaluate whether 
both promises can be performed within one year of the contract’s 
formation.
271
  Identifying the promises will not always be an easy anal-




a. Bilateral Contracts with a Definite Term of 
Employment Exceeding One Year, with No Right to 
Early Termination 
If the employer and the employee each orally agreed that the 
employment term would extend more than one year from the con-
tract’s formation, with no express or implied-in-fact right to terminate 
the relationship sooner, the contract is without question unenforcea-
ble under the Statute.
273
  Although the parties’ duties might be dis-
charged within a year as a result of doctrines such as impracticabili-
ty
274
 or frustration of purpose,
275
 this does not render the contract 
capable of being performed within one year because termination of 
the contract by operation of law is insufficient to take the contract 
out of the Statute.
276
  Thus, the possibility that the employee might 
die within a year does not take the contract outside of the Statute be-
cause the employee’s death would be excusable nonperformance by 
 
 271 See id. § 130(1) (“Where any promise in a contract cannot be fully performed 
within a year from the time the contract is made, all promises in the contract are 
within the Statute of Frauds until one party to the contract completes his perfor-
mance.” (emphasis added)). 
 272 Id. 
 273 4 CORBIN, supra note 63, § 19.4, at 595. 
 274 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). 
 275 See id. § 265. 
 276 See 4 CORBIN, supra note 63, § 19.4, at 596 (“[I]n service cases it is recognized, 
at least as a general rule, that termination of duty by operation of law is not identical 
with performance of a promise.” (footnote omitted)). 
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  If, however, the parties agree to a lifetime em-
ployment contract, the contract is not within the Statute because the 
employee might die within a year, and death would complete per-
formance (not excuse it).
278
 
b. Bilateral Contracts with a Right to Terminate the 
Employment Relationship Within One Year 
Many employment contracts that contemplate employment ex-
tending more than one year after formation include an express or 
implied-in-fact right by one or both of the parties to terminate the 
employment relationship within one year.  The application of the Sta-
tute to such contracts is complicated.  As the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts provides: “[T]he distinction between performance and 
excuse for nonperformance is sometimes tenuous; it depends on the 
terms and the circumstances, particularly on whether the essential 
purposes of the parties will be attained.”
279
 
i. A Right to Terminate the Employment Relationship at 
Will, with or Without Notice 
Perhaps the easiest case should be one in which the employer, 
the employee, or both, retain the right to terminate the employment 
relationship at will within one year of the contract’s formation.  
Whether notice is required before such a right is exercisable should 
be irrelevant.
280
  In such a case, the parties have agreed that perfor-
 
 277 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. b, illus. 5 (1981). 
 278 Id. illus. 9. 
 279 Id. cmt. b. 
 280 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts inexplicably takes the position that 
such a distinction is relevant.  For example, in one illustration, an employment con-
tract for five years that is subject to termination by either party upon thirty days’ no-
tice is not within the one-year provision.  Id. illus. 6.  In the next illustration, howev-
er, an employment contract for five years, which provides that the employee may quit 
at any time if he gives thirty days’ notice, is held to be within the one-year provision.  
Id. illus. 7.  It has been suggested that the apparent inconsistency between the illu-
strations is the result of the peculiar New York rule discussed previously, under which 
the Statute is inapplicable only if the defendant had the option to terminate the con-
tract within one year.  4 CORBIN, supra note 63, § 19.6, at 603 n.6.  This is based on 
the fact that the illustration is premised in part on a New York case.  Id.  But, as noted 
by Professor Caroline Brown, “the difficulty posed by the Restatement’s illustrations 
cannot entirely be explained by allusion to the New York cases: for one thing, illu-
stration 7 places no emphasis at all upon the identity of A, who holds the right of 
termination; for another, we are not told whether A is plaintiff or defendant.”  Id.  
Professor Perillo has noted that “[i]llustrations 6 and 7 appear to be contradictory.”  
PERILLO, supra note 95, at 669 n.2. 
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mance is only to last as long as one of the parties desires.  For exam-
ple, if the employee retains the right to terminate at will, it is likely 
that the employee has promised nothing more than to start work for 
the employer, and perhaps to perform his or her work satisfactorily 
while employed.
281
  If that is so, the employee completes the promised 
performance merely upon commencing work (and perhaps continu-
ing to perform satisfactorily while at work), and the employee’s exer-
cise of the right to terminate the employment relationship would oc-
cur after full performance of the employee’s promise.  In these cases, 
the employer’s duties under the contract would also be fully per-
formed upon termination of the employment relationship because 
the employer has kept the employee employed for as long as the em-
ployee desired.  Each party’s duties have thus been discharged 
through performance. 
Of course, the employee’s right to continue receiving wages is 
subject to the condition precedent of the employee continuing to 
perform services, but this is simply a condition to payment, not a 
promise by the employee to continue working.
282
  Also, the preceding 
discussion assumed that there are no post-employment duties to 
which the parties are subject that would necessarily extend beyond 
one year from the contract’s formation.
283
 
As previously discussed, some courts, most notably the court in 
Deevy v. Porter, have held that the termination of the employment re-
lationship under such circumstances would frustrate the essential 
purposes of the contract, particularly when the parties contemplated 
a term of employment for more than one year.
284
  In fact, the majority 
view is that a right to terminate a contract for any reason whatsoever 
is the defeasance of the contract, not its performance.
285
  But if the 
parties agreed that one or both of them could terminate at will, al-
 
 281 See, e.g., Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(inferring a promise by the employee to give his “best efforts”). 
 282 On the distinction between an express condition and a promise, see PERILLO, 
supra note 95, at 365–66. 
 283 However, it has been held that “a contract whereby an employee is to be paid a 
bonus or commission on an annual basis but which cannot be calculated and paid 
until after the books have been closed is not within the Statute although the bonus 
cannot be calculated until after the end of the year.” Id. at 667. Also, a noncompeti-
tion agreement is generally considered capable of being performed within a year be-
cause the employee’s death would be the equivalent of full performance.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. b & illus. 9 (1981). 
 284 Deevy v. Porter, 95 A.2d 596, 597–99 (N.J. 1953). 
 285 PERILLO, supra note 95, at 668. 
OGORMAN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2010  1:46 PM 
2010] ORAL PROMISES OF JOB SECURITY 1069 
 
though the parties might have hoped or expected for a longer rela-
tionship, they agreed that it need not last that long.  The majority 
view, including decisions like Deevy v. Porter, runs contrary to the es-
tablished rule that a contract is not within the Statute’s one-year pro-
vision as long as it is capable of being performed within one year, 
even if the parties hoped that performance would last longer.  Accor-
dingly, such an agreement is capable of being performed within one 
year. 
Decisions like Deevy v. Porter and French v. Sabey Corp. misconstrue 
the essential purpose of the contract.  When the parties agree that 
one party retains the right to terminate the employment relationship 
for any reason, the contract’s essential purpose is to provide employ-
ment for only as long as that party desires.  To suggest that the essen-
tial purpose of the contract was employment for a definite term can-
not be reconciled with the at-will termination provision.  The 
appearance of a promise to work for a definite term is an illusion.  It 
makes no sense to say that a party has promised to work for one year, 
unless he or she chooses to stop working sooner.  And absent a prom-
ise to work more than a year from the contract’s formation, the Sta-
tute is not a bar. 
It is certainly true that, if decisions like Deevy v. Porter and French 
v. Sabey Corp. were incorrect, the likely purposes of the Statute could 
be easily circumvented.  An employee could avoid the Statute by 
simply arguing that under the terms of the contract he or she (but 
not the employer, of course) retained the right to terminate the rela-
tionship at will.  But such an assertion might lack credibility and, 
therefore, make the likelihood of success small.  Also, such an asser-
tion might result in the court concluding that the employer’s promise 
lacked consideration because the employee did not provide a return 
promise.  The employee could avoid the consideration issue by alleg-
ing that he or she only retained the right to terminate the relation-
ship upon a certain amount of notice, but such an assertion would 
probably lack credibility. 
ii. Bilateral Contracts with a Right to Terminate the 
Employment Relationship upon the Occurrence of a 
Specific Event 
A bilateral contract under which the employer and the employee 
each agree to an employment term of longer than one year from its 
formation, subject to an explicit or implied-in-fact right to terminate 
upon the occurrence of a specific event (as opposed to at the mere 
will of either party) presents a more complicated case.  In such a situ-
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ation, the event giving rise to the right to terminate the employment 
relationship must be analyzed to determine if the event is closer to 
one that frustrates the contract’s purpose, or closer to performance. 
If the event is a breach of the contract, even a nonmaterial 
breach, it should not be considered performance of the contract, be-
cause a breach is not performance.  It will not always be easy, howev-
er, to determine if an event is a breach.  For example, an employer 
who has promised job security to an employee generally retains the 
right to terminate the employee for poor performance or miscon-
duct.
286
  Such a right might be explicit or implied-in-fact.  It is not al-
ways clear, however, that such an event is a breach of contract by the 
employee; it might simply be a condition to continued employment.  
To determine if the event was a breach, it would be necessary to de-
termine if the employee explicitly or impliedly promised to perform 
well, or to meet the job requirements (such that the employee could 
be sued for breach for failing to perform as promised). 
In any event, however, such events cannot be construed as at-
taining the parties’ “essential purposes,”
287
 and are closer to frustrat-
ing them.  For example, it has been asserted that “with a promise to 
employ someone as long as he meets the job requirements, the oc-
currence of the contingency—the employee’s failure to meet the re-
quirements—frustrates and cuts off the continuing performance of 
the contract.”
288
  Accordingly, termination based on such events does 
not constitute performance. 
Some definite-term employment contracts permit the employer 
to terminate the employment relationship if the employer is not sub-
jectively satisfied with the employee’s performance.
289
  In such a case, 
the employer might act unreasonably, but in good faith, and the em-
ployer would still be entitled to terminate the employment relation-
ship.  One commentator has argued that in such a contract, “the par-
 
 286 See, e.g., Ohanian, 779 F.2d at 107; Hetes v. Schefman & Miller Law Office, 393 
N.W.2d 577, 578 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). 
 287 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. b (1981) (providing that 
the distinction between performance and excuse for nonperformance “depends on 
the terms and the circumstances, particularly on whether the essential purposes of the 
parties will be attained.” (emphasis added)). 
 288 Milazzo v. O’Connell, 925 F. Supp. 1331, 1341 (N.D. Ill. 1996), aff’d, 108 F.3d 
129 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 289 See, e.g., Fursmidt v. Hotel Abbey Holding Corp., 200 N.Y.S.2d 256, 260 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1960) (holding that satisfaction clause involving valet and laundry service 
to a hotel entitled the hotel to terminate the relationship if the hotel was not ge-
nuinely and honestly satisfied with the services). 
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ties intend for the contingency, the employee’s unsatisfactory work 
for example, to constitute full performance of the contract.”
290
 
Although this is a more difficult case, such a termination should 
still be construed as closer to a frustration of the contract’s purpose 
than performance.  Under such a contract, the employer bargained 
for performance by the employee that would subjectively satisfy the 
employer.  If the employee did not provide such performance, the 
employee has not provided the employer with that which the contract 
was intended to secure.  It can hardly be said that the parties’ “essen-
tial purpose” was to have a relationship that would only last as long as 
the employer was satisfied with the employee’s performance.  Rather, 
the essential purpose was to have a satisfactory employment relation-
ship. 
The more complicated issue arises when the employer has re-
tained the right to terminate the employment relationship for rea-
sons other than poor performance by the employee.  For example, 
although some courts seemingly hold that an employment contract 
for a definite term of employment does not include an implied right 
to terminate based on the elimination of the employee’s position,
291
 
other courts hold that an employer retains the right to terminate for 
economic reasons.
292
  Thus, some courts have construed a promise to 
terminate the employment relationship only for “just cause” as in-




For the former courts, the contract would unquestionably be 
within the Statute—assuming it was a definite-term contract for more 
than one year from formation—because any termination prior to the 
end of the employment period would be a breach.  Even for the latter 
courts, however, the event permitting termination is closer to excusa-
ble nonperformance than performance, and thus the contract should 
still be within the Statute.  At a minimum, any event not addressed in 
the contract that would have discharged a party’s duties under the 
 
 290 Haroutunian, supra note 8, at 510. 
 291 See, e.g., Grappone v. City of Miami Beach, 495 So. 2d 838, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1986) (holding that complaint stated a claim for breach of definite-term em-
ployment contract when employer eliminated position); Helberg v. Cmty. Work & 
Dev. Ctr. Indus., Inc., No. CX-93-958, 1994 WL 1121, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 
1994) (holding that definite-term contract did not include right to terminate em-
ployee because position was eliminated). 
 292 See, e.g., Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 101, 107–08 (2d Cir. 
1985). 
 293 See id. 
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doctrines of supervening impracticability
294
 or supervening frustration 
of purpose
295
 should be considered a discharge through excusable 
nonperformance.  Because discharge under the doctrines of imprac-
ticability and frustration of purpose are considered excusable non-
performance,
296
 the mere fact that the parties addressed the occur-
rence of the event in the contract does not necessarily mean the 
event should be considered “performance” instead of excusable non-
performance.
297
  Therefore, merely because the parties indicate that 
an employee’s duties under a definite-term contract would be dis-
charged as a result of the employee’s death, the death would not be 
considered “performance” because it is an event that would have dis-
charged the employee’s duties under the doctrine of impracticability 
if it had not been addressed in the contract.
298
 
With respect to events that would not have discharged a party’s 
duties under the doctrines of impracticability or frustration of pur-
pose, the issue is whether such events are closer to the types of events 
that would fall within those doctrines or closer to an alternative me-
thod of performance.  Because such cases will present a myriad of dif-
ferent contingencies that will permit termination of the employment 
relationship, each case must be analyzed to determine if the event is 
closer to performance or closer to impracticability or frustration.  In 
general, an event that is not within either party’s control would seem 
to be closer to an event that would have discharged the party’s duties 
under the doctrines of impracticability or frustration of purpose.  Al-
so, as previously discussed, in “close” or “doubtful” cases, the likely 
purposes of the Statute’s one-year provision and the employment-at-
will doctrine dictate that discharge as a result of the event should be 
considered excusable nonperformance. 
 
 294 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). 
 295 See id. § 265. 
 296 See 4 CORBIN, supra note 63, § 19.4, at 596 (“[I]n service cases it is recognized, 
at least as a general rule, that termination of duty by operation of law is not identical 
with performance of a promise.” (footnote omitted)). 
 297 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. b (1981) (“The pos-
sibility that such a discharge or excuse may occur within a year is not a possibility that 
the contract will be ‘performed’ within a year.  This is so even though the excuse is articu-
lated in the agreement.” (emphasis added)). 
 298 Id. illus. 5; see also id. § 262 (“If the existence of a particular person is necessary 
for the performance of a duty, his death or such incapacity as makes performance 
impracticable is an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on 
which the contract was made.”). 
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Under this approach, an express or implied right to terminate 
based on adverse business conditions is closer to impracticability or 
frustration of purpose than performance.  Even though adverse mar-
ket conditions are generally not events that permit discharge under 
the doctrines of frustration or impracticability,
299
 such an event would 
be closer to frustration of purpose than an alternative method of per-
formance.  The illustrations in the Second Restatement of Contracts 
show that for discharge based on the occurrence of an event to be 
considered “performance,” the primary object of the contract must 
thereby be fully performed as a result of the event’s occurrence.  For 
example, a promise to make support payments to a child until the 
child becomes twenty-one years old can be performed within a year 
because “[i]f the child dies within a year, the primary object of fur-
nishing necessaries to the child will be fully ‘performed.’”
300
  Likewise, 
a noncompetition agreement that extends more than one year can be 
performed within one year because the employee’s death within one 
year would give the employer “the equivalent of full performance.”
301
 
With respect to an express or implied right to terminate a defi-
nite-term employment contract within a year based on adverse mar-
ket conditions, the occurrence of such an event does not result in the 
primary object of the contract being fully attained.  Unlike a contract 
that reserves to one party the right to terminate the contract at will, 
the primary object of a definite-term employment contract under 
which each party is bound to the term is to have an employment du-
ration for the full period.  An early termination should not be consi-
dered an alternative method of performance because that would sug-
gest that if the event occurred, the parties would agree that each 
party’s expected benefits under the contract had been realized.  
Without question, the employee would not feel this way.  Additional-
ly, if this were considered a “close” or “doubtful” case (which I do not 
think it is), the purpose of the Statute’s one-year provision and the 
purpose of the employment-at-will doctrine dictate that discharge be 
considered excusable nonperformance. 
Accordingly, the court’s conclusion in Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car 
System, Inc. that an employer’s right to terminate the employment re-
lationship because of adverse market conditions was equivalent to 
 
 299 See, e.g., Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987) 
(holding that liability insurance crisis did not discharge duty to obtain such insur-
ance). 
 300 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. b, illus. 8 (1981). 
 301 Id. illus. 9. 
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performance was incorrect.  The court incorrectly concluded that 
simply because it would not have been a breach, it meant the contract 
could be performed within a year.
302
  Importantly, however, because 
the contract was not for a definite term but instead seemed to be a 
promise for lifetime employment, the possibility of the employee’s 
death within one year should have constituted the equivalent of full 
performance. 
Other agreements provide that a particular event unrelated to 
the employee’s performance or adverse market conditions will termi-
nate the employment relationship.  For example, as previously dis-
cussed, in Coan v. Orsinger, the plaintiff alleged that his employer 
orally promised him the job of resident manager of an apartment de-
velopment, with the job to last until he either completed law school 
(which he had just started) or was obliged to discontinue those stu-
dies.
303
  In a case such as Coan, it is necessary to make a factual finding 
as to the “essential purposes of the parties”
304
 and the “primary object” 
of the contract.
305
  If the essential purpose was simply to provide the 
employee with a job for as long as he was in law school, the occur-
rence of the event—the employee being obliged to discontinue his 
law studies—would be closer to performance.  If, however, the essen-
tial purpose was to provide the parties with a three-year employment 
relationship, the occurrence of the event would be closer to frustra-
tion of purpose. 
If, after reviewing the available evidence, the issue remains 
doubtful, the event should be considered closer to frustration.  First, 
it is the type of event that might discharge the employee’s duties un-
der the doctrine of frustration of purpose.  Being obliged to discon-
tinue law studies was likely an event whose non-occurrence was a “ba-
sic assumption on which the contract was made,”
306
 and it might have 
been a job needed to help pay for law school while the employee was 
in the area.  Second, the event was one essentially outside of the par-
ties’ control.  Third, such a finding would promote the purposes of 
the Statute’s one-year provision and the employment-at-will doctrine. 
Professor Richard Lord, who contends that the case was incor-
rectly decided, states that “what the court appears to have overlooked 
 
 302 779 F.2d 101, 107–08 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 303 265 F.2d 575, 575–76 (D.C. Cir. 1959). 
 304 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. b (1981). 
 305 Id. illus. 8. 
 306 Id. § 265. 
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is that if anything had happened to interrupt plaintiff’s studies, the 
performance of his duties (his promise to serve) as residential man-
ager would have been complete, and nothing more would have been 
required of him. . . .”
307
  But Professor Lord’s approach would eradi-
cate the distinction between performance and excusable nonperfor-
mance in employment cases.  Any event, other than a breach, that 
would permit a party to terminate the employment relationship with-
in a year would constitute performance because the employee worked 
as long as he or she was legally required to.  This approach is incon-
sistent with the rule that a party’s discharge through excuse is not the 
equivalent of performance, and ignores the obligation to determine 
if the parties’ “essential purposes” would be attained by the occur-
rence of the event. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When addressing a Statute of Frauds defense to a breach of con-
tract claim by an employee alleging an oral promise of job security, 
the court must carefully determine what express or implied promises 
have been made by each party.  Often, an employee will not have 
made any promise, and the employee’s performance will be complete 
when the contract is formed. 
Even when the employee has made a return promise, often the 
only express or implied-in-fact promise made by the employee will be 
a promise to start work, to use his or her best efforts upon starting 
work, or both.  If these are the only express or implied-in-fact prom-
ises made by the employee, the employee will retain the right to ter-
minate the employment relationship at any time.  If the employee 
terminates the employment relationship within a year of entering in-
to the contract, the employee will have fully performed his or her 
promises.  Likewise, the employer will have fully performed its prom-
ise of providing job security as long as the employee chooses to main-
tain the employment relationship.  Also, because a “just cause” ter-
mination provision is the equivalent of a promise of lifetime 
employment, the contract can be performed within a year as a result 
of the employee’s death. 
With respect to the right to terminate a definite-term employ-
ment contract because of a particular event, the court must deter-
mine whether discharge as a result of the event’s occurrence is closer 
to discharge under the doctrines of impracticability or frustration of 
 
 307 9 WILLISTON, supra note 83, § 24:3, at 452 n.45. 
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purpose, or to performance.  In making this determination, the court 
must consider the parties’ “essential purposes” and the primary ob-
ject of the contract.  Only if the event accomplishes the parties’ essen-
tial purposes and the primary object of the contract would the event 
be considered the equivalent of full performance.  If the event is one 
that would have discharged a party’s duties under the doctrines of 
impracticability or frustration of purpose, it is closer to excusable 
nonperformance than performance.  Also, if the event is one outside 
of the parties’ control, it is likely to be an event closer to excusable 
nonperformance.  Further, in “close” or “doubtful” cases, the pur-
pose of the Statute’s one-year provision and the purpose of the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine dictate a finding that the event is closer to 
excusable nonperformance than performance. 
 
